No article text was recorded for this version.
truthful mechanism design
Version 1 of 1348 papers444 conceptsfrozen 2026-10-04
Papers in this version
- Blog: Exploring the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism for Electricity Markets
- Blog: An Incentive Compatible, Efficient Market for Air Traffic Flow Management
- Blog: Applying the Generalized Vickrey Auction to Pricing Reliable Multicasts
- Blog: SOCIALMAPF: Optimal and Efficient Multi-Agent Path Finding with Strategic Agents for Social Navigation
- Blog: Mechanism Design for Cost Optimal PAC Learning in the Presence of Strategic Noisy Annotators
- Blog: Ginseng: Market-Driven LLC Allocation
- Blog: An Auction Based Distribute Mechanism for P2P Adaptive Bandwidth Allocation
- Blog: Mechanism Design for LLM Fine-tuning with Multiple Reward Models
- Blog: CENTURION: Incentivizing multi-requester mobile crowd sensing
- Blog: ERA: A Framework for Economic Resource Allocation for the Cloud
- Blog: Integration of Blockchain-Based Peer-To-Peer Energy Markets in Industrial Water-Energy-Network
- Blog: Electric Vehicle Charging Scheduling in Green Logistics: Challenges, Approaches and Opportunities
- Blog: A Double Auction for Charging Scheduling among Vehicles Using DAG-Blockchains
- Blog: Truthful Aggregation of LLMs with an Application to Online Advertising
- Blog: Incentive Compatibility in Two-Stage Repeated Stochastic Games
- Blog: A Learning-based Incentive Mechanism for Mobile AIGC Service in Decentralized Internet of Vehicles
- Blog: Contract Design for Energy Demand Response
- Blog: No Bidding, No Regret: Pairwise-Feedback Mechanisms for Digital Goods and Data Auctions
- Blog: Multi-Unit Auctions: Beyond Roberts
- Blog: Learning for Dynamic Bidding in Cognitive Radio Resources
- Blog: Mechanism Design for Cost Optimal PAC Learning in the Presence of Strategic Noisy Annotators
- Blog: Online incentive mechanism design for smartphone crowd-sourcing
- Blog: Utility Maximizer or Value Maximizer: Mechanism Design for Mixed Bidders in Online Advertising
- Blog: Differentiable Economics for Randomized Affine Maximizer Auctions
- Blog: Shapley-Based Core-Selecting Payment Rules
- Blog: FMore: An Incentive Scheme of Multi-dimensional Auction for Federated Learning in MEC
- Blog: Dynamic Reserve Price Design with Distributed Solving Algorithm
- Blog: Maximize the Long-term Average Revenue of Network Slice Provider via Admission Control Among Heterogeneous Slices
- Blog: Market Design for Capacity Sharing in Networks
- Blog: A game-theoretic approach to a task delegation problem
- Blog: Triple Eagle: Simple, Fast and Practical Budget-Feasible Mechanisms
- Blog: Mechanism Design for Large Language Models
- Blog: Make Restaurants Pay Your Server Bills
- Blog: Generalizing Virtual Values to Multidimensional Auctions: a Non-Myersonian Approach
- Blog: Approximately Maximizing the Broker's Profit in a Two-sided Market
- Blog: Diffusion-based Auction Mechanism for Efficient Resource Management in 6G-enabled Vehicular Metaverses
- Blog: Differentiable Economics for Randomized Affine Maximizer Auctions
- Blog: Bidding Clubs in First-Price Auctions
- Blog: Simple, Credible, and Approximately-Optimal Auctions
- Blog: True-MCSA: A Framework for Truthful Double Multi-Channel Spectrum Auctions
- Blog: Reliable Traffic Monitoring Mechanisms Based on Blockchain in Vehicular Networks
- Blog: Auto-bidding with Budget and ROI Constrained Buyers
- Blog: Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions
- Blog: A Market Mechanism for Virtual Inertia
- Blog: IEMAS: An Incentive-Efficiency Routing Framework for Open Agentic Web Ecosystems
- Blog: SepALM: Audio Language Models Are Error Correctors for Robust Speech Separation
- Blog: A Truthful Auction for Graph Job Allocation in Vehicular Cloud-Assisted Networks
- Blog: Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
- Blog: OURS: optimal unicast routing systems in non-cooperative wireless networks
- Blog: Privacy Preserving and Cost Optimal Mobile Crowdsensing using Smart Contracts on Blockchain
- Blog: k-price auctions and Combination auctions
- Blog: More on the Power of Demand Queries in Combinatorial Auctions: Learning Atomic Languages and Handling Incentives
- Blog: Mechanism Designs for Stochastic Resources for Renewable Energy Integration
- Blog: Multi-Unit Diffusion Auctions with Intermediaries
- Blog: Truthfulness with Value-Maximizing Bidders
- Blog: Distributed Radio Slice Allocation in Wireless Network Virtualization: Matching Theory Meets Auctions
- Blog: Sponsored Question Answering
- Blog: Multi-unit auctions: Beyond Roberts
- Blog: Emergency Demand Response in Edge Computing
- Blog: Distributed Auction-Based Incentive Mechanism for Energy Trading Between Electric Vehicles and Mobile Charging Stations
Showing 60 of 348 papers.
History & citation
Current · Permanent link
- Truthful Mechanisms for Decentralized Resource Markets merged into this direction (57% overlap)
Cite this direction
Latest version (a living page):
@misc{lacuna_truthful_mechanism_design_7cffe958,
title = {truthful mechanism design},
author = {{Lacuna}},
howpublished = {Lacuna research direction},
year = {2026},
url = {https://lacuna.tiptreesystems.com/direction/truthful-mechanism-design/rdr_7cffe958702d4be3903877ed782a729c},
note = {Latest version of a living research direction; cite a version for a fixed text. Accessed 2026-11-20},
}This exact version (version 1, frozen text):
@misc{lacuna_truthful_mechanism_design_7cffe958_v1,
title = {truthful mechanism design},
author = {{Lacuna}},
howpublished = {Lacuna research direction},
year = {2026},
url = {https://lacuna.tiptreesystems.com/direction/truthful-mechanism-design/rdr_7cffe958702d4be3903877ed782a729c/v/1},
note = {Version 1, frozen 2026-10-04. Accessed 2026-11-20},
}