No article text was recorded for this version.
strategic voting manipulation
Version 1 of 144 papers47 conceptsfrozen 2026-10-04
Papers in this version
- Blog: Learning to Manipulate Under Limited Information
- Blog: Strategic Voting Under Uncertainty About the Voting Method
- Blog: Optimal Bounds for Dissatisfaction in Perpetual Voting
- Blog: Algorithmic Game Theory: Special Issue Introduction
- Blog: Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty
- Blog: Agenda Separability in Judgment Aggregation
- Blog: Voting with Rank Dependent Scoring Rules
- Blog: Rules for Choosing Societal Tradeoffs
- Blog: Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate
- Blog: Complexity of and Algorithms for Borda Manipulation
- Blog: Strategic Voting with Incomplete Information
- Blog: Dominating Manipulations in Voting with Partial Information
- Blog: Kemeny Consensus Complexity
- Blog: Exact algorithms for weighted and unweighted Borda manipulation problems
- Blog: Eliminating the Weakest Link: Making Manipulation Intractable?
- Blog: Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard
- Blog: Ranking Wily People Who Rank Each Other
- Blog: Preventing Manipulation in Aggregating Audiences in Value-Based Argumentation Frameworks
- Blog: AI's War on Manipulation: Are We Winning?
- Blog: New Approximations for Coalitional Manipulation in Scoring Rules
- Blog: Manipulative Elicitation - A New Attack on Elections with Incomplete Preferences
- Blog: Correlated Voting
- Blog: Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules
- Blog: Beyond RLHF and NLHF: Population-Proportional Alignment under an Axiomatic Framework
- Blog: Voting: A View through the Algorithmic Lens
- Blog: Complexity of Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation under Some Common Voting Rules
- Blog: The Clarke Tax as a Consensus Mechanism Among Automated Agents
- Blog: Variation in weighted voting games
- Blog: Coalitional manipulation for Schulze's rule
- Blog: A Smooth Transition from Powerlessness to Absolute Power
- Blog: Robust Voting Rules from Algorithmic Robust Statistics
- Blog: A Complexity-of-Strategic-Behavior Comparison between Schulze's Rule and Ranked Pairs
- Blog: Stable Voting
- Blog: Wisdom of the Crowd Voting: Truthful Aggregation of Voter Information and Preferences
- Blog: Gibbard-Satterthwaite Games
- Blog: Efficient, Private, and eps-Strategyproof Elicitation of Tournament Voting Rules
- Blog: Imputation, Social Choice, and Partial Preferences
- Blog: A quantitative Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem without neutrality
- Blog: Social Ranking Manipulability for the CP-Majority, Banzhaf and Lexicographic Excellence Solutions
- Blog: A Quantitative Version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for Three Alternatives
- Blog: Byzantine Preferential Voting
- Blog: How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?
- Blog: Shortlisting Rules and Incentives in an End-to-End Model for Participatory Budgeting
- Blog: Partial strategyproofness: Relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
History & citation
Current · Permanent link
- This direction split from Resistance to Strategic Manipulation in Collective Decisions (77% overlap)
Cite this direction
Latest version (a living page):
@misc{lacuna_strategic_voting_manipulation_9cbc9d62,
title = {strategic voting manipulation},
author = {{Lacuna}},
howpublished = {Lacuna research direction},
year = {2026},
url = {https://lacuna.tiptreesystems.com/direction/strategic-voting-manipulation/rdr_9cbc9d6236f34324b990623ffd2f9d81},
note = {Latest version of a living research direction; cite a version for a fixed text. Accessed 2026-11-21},
}This exact version (version 1, frozen text):
@misc{lacuna_strategic_voting_manipulation_9cbc9d62_v1,
title = {strategic voting manipulation},
author = {{Lacuna}},
howpublished = {Lacuna research direction},
year = {2026},
url = {https://lacuna.tiptreesystems.com/direction/strategic-voting-manipulation/rdr_9cbc9d6236f34324b990623ffd2f9d81/v/1},
note = {Version 1, frozen 2026-10-04. Accessed 2026-11-21},
}