Repurposing Radar Signals as Artificial Noise for Secure Communication

This direction is merged into another direction: perfect channel state information assumption (imperfect channel state information). Its last version stays readable and citable here.

Version 1 of 112 papers22 conceptsfrozen 2026-10-04

In traditional wireless design, sensing and security are often treated as competing interests. If a base station wants to track a target using radar, it must expend energy on a probing signal; if it wants to protect a private message from an eavesdropper, it might expend additional energy on "artificial noise" (AN) to jam the intruder's reception. This creates a zero-sum game for the system's power and spectral resources.

Recent research into Integrated Sensing and Communication (ISAC) flips this trade-off on its head. Instead of treating radar signals and jamming noise as separate overheads, researchers are developing dual-functional waveforms where the sensing signal is the artificial noise. By repurposing the high-energy beams required for radar to simultaneously degrade an adversary's channel, 6G networks can achieve high-precision tracking and robust physical layer security with no additional power cost.

The Synergy of Dual-Functional Artificial Noise

The core intuition behind this direction is that radar signals and jamming signals share a fundamental physical requirement: they both need to be high-power and directed toward a specific area of interest.

In a standard secure communication setup, a transmitter sends a secret message to a legitimate user and broadcasts random noise in the direction of a potential eavesdropper. In the ISAC paradigm, as explored by Yinchao Yang, Mohammad Shikh‐Bahaei, and others in Joint Semantic Communication and Target Sensing for 6G Communication System, this noise is replaced by a structured sensing waveform. This "Dual-Functional Artificial Noise" (DFAN) serves two roles:

  1. Illumination: It bounces off a target (which might be the eavesdropper itself) to provide radar returns for tracking.
  2. Interference: It intentionally degrades the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) at the eavesdropper's location, making it impossible for them to decode the primary data stream.

This mechanism is particularly effective because radar detection requires significant power to overcome path loss on the return trip. As Qian Dan and Hongjiang Lei argue in Beamforming Design for Joint Target Sensing and Proactive Eavesdropping, these naturally high-power waveforms are "free" jammers that can be used for proactive surveillance or to neutralize unauthorized receivers.

Turning the Jammer into a Sensor

One of the most elegant facets of this research is the ability to sense a target using the very energy intended to suppress it. In traditional security, you jam an eavesdropper to keep them "in the dark." In secure ISAC, you jam them to "light them up."

Jingjing Zhao and Songtao Xue demonstrate this in Near-Field Integrated Sensing and Communications for Secure UAV Networks. By exploiting near-field spherical wave propagation, a UAV can use its jamming signal as a probing waveform to track an eavesdropper’s 3D trajectory in real-time. This creates a closed-loop security system: the radar returns tell the UAV exactly where the eavesdropper is, allowing the UAV to more accurately aim its jamming beam, which in turn provides even better radar returns.

Similarly, Hao Jiang and Zhiguo Ding utilize this synergy in Pinching Antenna System (PASS) Enhanced Covert Communications: Against Warden via Sensing. They show that by using artificial noise as a probing signal, a system can acquire channel state information about a passive adversary (a "warden") without needing the warden's cooperation, enabling highly effective covert communication.

Efficiency and Scalability in 6G

A major concern in physical layer security is the hardware overhead—specifically, how many antennas or beams are needed to jam multiple intruders. Fanghao Xia and Jie Xu address this in Towards Secure ISAC Beamforming: How Many Dedicated Sensing Beams Are Required?. They provide a theoretical "worst-case rank bound," proving that the number of dedicated sensing beams required to secure a link scales efficiently with the number of eavesdroppers. This suggests that secure ISAC is not just a niche trick but a scalable architecture for dense 6G environments like V2X (Vehicle-to-Everything) networks.

In the context of the "Low-Altitude Economy," Weihao Mao and Tony Q. S. Quek show in Covert Communications in MEC-Based Networked ISAC Systems Towards Low-Altitude Economy that embedding communication signals within the noise floor created by sensing activity allows drones to transmit data undetectably. By treating the radar signal as a "friendly jammer," the system masks its own presence from observers while maintaining spatial awareness.

Robustness Against Adversarial Jamming

The relationship between sensing and jamming is not always one-way. In contested environments, an adversary might attempt to jam the radar itself. Ziang Wang and Yimin Liu propose a Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) approach in A MARL Based Multi-Target Tracking Algorithm Under Jamming Against Radar that turns this threat into an advantage. By toggling between active emission and passive sensing, UAV swarms can use an adversary's jamming signal as a localization beacon, effectively using the enemy's interference to improve their own tracking precision.

By unifying these once-disparate functions—sensing, communication, and jamming—into a single waveform design, this research direction provides a blueprint for 6G networks that are inherently more secure, more aware, and more resource-efficient.

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Latest version (a living page):

@misc{lacuna_repurposing_radar_signals_as_artificial__55c3e60d,
  title = {Repurposing Radar Signals as Artificial Noise for Secure Communication},
  author = {{Lacuna}},
  howpublished = {Lacuna research direction},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://lacuna.tiptreesystems.com/direction/repurposing-radar-signals-as-artificial-noise-for-secure-communication/rdr_55c3e60daaaf425aae59669c5380ab02},
  note = {Latest version of a living research direction; cite a version for a fixed text. Accessed 2026-11-19},
}

This exact version (version 1, frozen text):

@misc{lacuna_repurposing_radar_signals_as_artificial__55c3e60d_v1,
  title = {Repurposing Radar Signals as Artificial Noise for Secure Communication},
  author = {{Lacuna}},
  howpublished = {Lacuna research direction},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://lacuna.tiptreesystems.com/direction/repurposing-radar-signals-as-artificial-noise-for-secure-communication/rdr_55c3e60daaaf425aae59669c5380ab02/v/1},
  note = {Version 1, frozen 2026-10-04. Accessed 2026-11-19},
}