Physical Layer Security for Non Orthogonal Multiple Access

This direction is merged into another direction: perfect channel state information assumption (imperfect channel state information). Its last version stays readable and citable here.

Version 1 of 125 papers27 conceptsfrozen 2026-10-04

In the quest for 5G and 6G connectivity, Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access (NOMA) has emerged as a vital strategy for packing more users into limited frequency bands. Unlike traditional methods that give each user their own "lane" (orthogonal access), NOMA stacks multiple users on top of each other in the same lane, separating them by power levels.

However, this efficiency comes with a fundamental security flaw: by design, NOMA broadcasts everyone’s data to everyone else. To make the system work, some users are even required to decode their neighbors' signals. This creates a unique challenge where the network is vulnerable not just to outside hackers, but to its own legitimate users.

The NOMA Security Paradox

To understand the vulnerability, we must look at how NOMA handles interference. In a typical downlink scenario, a base station sends a superimposed signal containing data for both a "near" user (with a strong channel) and a "far" user (with a weak channel).

As Yuanwei Liu and Zhiguo Ding explain in Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access for 5G and Beyond, the near user must perform Successive Interference Cancellation (SIC). This means the near user first decodes the far user's signal, subtracts it from the total, and then decodes their own.

This architectural requirement introduces two distinct threats:

  1. External Eavesdropping: Because the signal is broadcast over a shared medium, any unauthorized receiver in range can attempt to intercept the superimposed stream, as noted by Gerardo Gómez in Physical Layer Security in Uplink NOMA Multi-Antenna Systems.
  2. Internal Snooping: Since the near user must decode the far user's data to clear interference, the far user's privacy is inherently compromised. If the near user is malicious, they already have the decoded data in hand. Yingjie Pei and Xinwei Yue highlight this "internal eavesdropping" as a critical risk in Secrecy Outage Probability Analysis for Downlink RIS-NOMA Networks.

Turning Interference into a Shield

Rather than relying solely on high-level encryption, researchers are using Physical Layer Security (PLS) to protect data by exploiting the physics of the wireless channel itself.

A primary tool in this space is Interference Engineering. As proposed by Hai Jiang and Zhiguo Ding in Intelligent Interference Engineering for Secure Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access, interference is no longer treated as a nuisance. Instead, the base station can intentionally inject Artificial Noise (AN) into the signal.

The intuition is simple: the noise is designed to fall into the "null space" of the legitimate user's channel—meaning it cancels out by the time it reaches them—but it remains a chaotic, garbled mess for an eavesdropper at a different location. Ming Zeng demonstrates in Securing Downlink Massive MIMO-NOMA Networks With Artificial Noise that this technique can effectively "blind" eavesdroppers without hurting the network's throughput.

Sculpting the Environment with RIS

The most recent evolution in securing NOMA involves Reconfigurable Intelligent Surfaces (RIS). An RIS is a flat panel of thousands of tiny, passive reflecting elements that can shift the phase of incoming radio waves.

In Physical Layer Security of Intelligent Reflective Surface Aided NOMA Networks, Tianwei Hou and Yuanwei Liu show how RIS can be used to "sculpt" the wireless environment. By carefully adjusting the reflections, the RIS can:

  • Strengthen the signal at the legitimate user's location through constructive interference.
  • Weaken or nullify the signal at the eavesdropper's location through destructive interference.

Xuehua Li further explores Active RIS (ARIS) in Secure Communication of Active RIS Assisted NOMA Networks, which adds small amplifiers to the surface. This allows the network to overcome the "double-fading" effect (where the signal loses power both going to and coming from the surface), providing a much more robust security margin against sophisticated interceptors.

Geometry as a Security Guarantee

To prove these systems work in the real world, where eavesdroppers move randomly, researchers use Stochastic Geometry. This mathematical approach treats the positions of users and attackers as a "cloud" of points.

Yuanwei Liu and Maged Elkashlan used this in Enhancing the Physical Layer Security of Non-orthogonal Multiple Access in Large-Scale Networks to define "protected zones." By ensuring no eavesdroppers are within a certain radius of the base station, and by using artificial noise to mask signals beyond that radius, they can mathematically guarantee a "Secrecy Outage Probability"—the likelihood that a message remains private even in a crowded, unpredictable environment.

By combining these spatial (RIS), signal-based (Artificial Noise), and geometric strategies, researchers are transforming NOMA from a vulnerable broadcast system into a secure, high-capacity backbone for future networks.

Papers in this version

History & citationVersion 1 · 2026-10-04

Merged into another direction · Permanent link

View frozen version 1

Cite this direction

Latest version (a living page):

@misc{lacuna_physical_layer_security_for_non_orthogon_4d799ce3,
  title = {Physical Layer Security for Non Orthogonal Multiple Access},
  author = {{Lacuna}},
  howpublished = {Lacuna research direction},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://lacuna.tiptreesystems.com/direction/physical-layer-security-for-non-orthogonal-multiple-access/rdr_4d799ce30e94452d9c6507b260bf434c},
  note = {Latest version of a living research direction; cite a version for a fixed text. Accessed 2026-11-19},
}

This exact version (version 1, frozen text):

@misc{lacuna_physical_layer_security_for_non_orthogon_4d799ce3_v1,
  title = {Physical Layer Security for Non Orthogonal Multiple Access},
  author = {{Lacuna}},
  howpublished = {Lacuna research direction},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://lacuna.tiptreesystems.com/direction/physical-layer-security-for-non-orthogonal-multiple-access/rdr_4d799ce30e94452d9c6507b260bf434c/v/1},
  note = {Version 1, frozen 2026-10-04. Accessed 2026-11-19},
}