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perfect recall assumption
Version 2 of 2155 papers188 conceptsfrozen 2026-10-04
Papers in this version
- Blog: MCMAS-SLK: A Model Checker for the Verification of Strategy Logic Specifications
- Blog: Strategic Abilities of Forgetful Agents in Stochastic Environments
- Blog: Probabilistic Strategy Logic
- Blog: MCMAS-SLK: A Model Checker for the Verification of Strategy Logic Specifications
- Blog: Epistemic GDL: A Logic for Representing and Reasoning about Imperfect Information Games
- Blog: Approximating Perfect Recall when Model Checking Strategic Abilities: Theory and Applications
- Blog: Model Checking ATL* on vCGS
- Blog: On Imperfect Recall in Multi-Agent Influence Diagrams
- Blog: Towards Action Prediction Using a Mental-Level Model
- Blog: Model Checking Probabilistic Epistemic Logic for Probabilistic Multiagent Systems
- Blog: The Computational Complexity of Single-Player Imperfect-Recall Games
- Blog: HGMP: Heterogeneous Graph Multi-Task Prompt Learning
- Blog: Budget-Constrained Coalition Strategies with Discounting
- Blog: Together We Know How to Achieve: An Epistemic Logic of Know-How (Extended Abstract)
- Blog: Strategic Abilities of Forgetful Agents in Stochastic Environments
- Blog: Decision Making under Imperfect Recall: Algorithms and Benchmarks
- Blog: Natural Strategic Ability in Stochastic Multi-Agent Systems
- Blog: Zero-Determinant Strategies in Iterated Public Goods Game
- Blog: A Complete Criterion for Value of Information in Soluble Influence Diagrams
- Blog: Strategic Coalitions with Perfect Recall
- Blog: Together we know how to achieve: An epistemic logic of know-how
- Blog: The Value of Recall in Extensive-Form Games
- Blog: A Complete Criterion for Value of Information in Soluble Influence Diagrams
- Blog: Reinforcement with Fading Memories
- Blog: Learning in Multi-Memory Games Triggers Complex Dynamics Diverging from Nash Equilibrium
- Blog: Evolutionary Dynamics of Q-Learning over the Sequence Form
- Blog: Using Correlated Strategies for Computing Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games
- Blog: A Marriage between Adversarial Team Games and 2-player Games: Enabling Abstractions, No-regret Learning, and Subgame Solving
- Blog: Solving Limited Memory Influence Diagrams
- Blog: Solving Limited Memory Influence Diagrams
- Blog: Reasoning about Knowledge and Strategies: Epistemic Strategy Logic
- Blog: Monte Carlo Sampling for Regret Minimization in Extensive Games
- Blog: Natural Analysts in Adaptive Data Analysis
- Blog: Learning in Games with progressive hiding
- Blog: Extensive Games with Possibly Unaware Players
- Blog: Reasoning under uncertainty in the game of Cops and Robbers
- Blog: Game-Theoretic Semantics for ATL+ with Applications to Model Checking
- Blog: Modeling Belief in Dynamic Systems, Part I: Foundations
- Blog: Solving Limited Memory Influence Diagrams
- Blog: Optimal Continual Learning has Perfect Memory and is NP-hard
- Blog: Look-ahead Reasoning with a Learned Model in Imperfect Information Games
- Blog: Solving Decision Problems with Limited Information
- Blog: Strategy Logic with Simple Goals: Tractable Reasoning about Strategies
- Blog: Probabilistic Strategy Logic with Degrees of Observability
- Blog: An Epistemic Strategy Logic
- Blog: Time for Action: On the Relation Between Time, Knowledge and Action
- Blog: Sequential Equilibrium in Computational Games
- Blog: No-Regret Learning in Extensive-Form Games with Imperfect Recall
- Blog: Planning for Stochastic Games with Co-Safe Objectives
- Blog: Conditions on Preference Relations that Guarantee the Existence of Optimal Policies
- Blog: Automated construction of bounded-loss imperfect-recall abstractions in extensive-form games
- Blog: Polynomial-Time Optimal Equilibria with a Mediator in Extensive-Form Games
- Blog: Formal Verification of Bayesian Mechanisms
- Blog: The Evolutionary Price of Anarchy: Locally Bounded Agents in a Dynamic Virus Game
- Blog: Self-Play $Q$-Learners Can Provably Collude in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
- Blog: Q-learners Can Provably Collude in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
- Blog: Human-in-the-Loop Synthesis for Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes
- Blog: Geometry of Policy Improvement
- Blog: The Complexity of Model Checking Succinct Multiagent Systems
- Blog: Model Checking Temporal Epistemic Logic under Bounded Recall
Showing 60 of 155 papers.
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Latest version (a living page):
@misc{lacuna_perfect_recall_assumption_7c775e84,
title = {perfect recall assumption},
author = {{Lacuna}},
howpublished = {Lacuna research direction},
year = {2026},
url = {https://lacuna.tiptreesystems.com/direction/perfect-recall-assumption/rdr_7c775e84ab6449578a641290e7ee0fe9},
note = {Latest version of a living research direction; cite a version for a fixed text. Accessed 2026-11-20},
}This exact version (version 2, frozen text):
@misc{lacuna_perfect_recall_assumption_7c775e84_v2,
title = {perfect recall assumption},
author = {{Lacuna}},
howpublished = {Lacuna research direction},
year = {2026},
url = {https://lacuna.tiptreesystems.com/direction/perfect-recall-assumption/rdr_7c775e84ab6449578a641290e7ee0fe9/v/2},
note = {Version 2, frozen 2026-10-04. Accessed 2026-11-20},
}