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no-overbidding assumption
Version 1 of 179 papers104 conceptsfrozen 2026-10-04
Papers in this version
- Blog: Simultaneous Auctions are (almost) Efficient
- Blog: The Price of Stability for First Price Auction
- Blog: First Price Auction is 1 – 1 /e<sup>2</sup> Efficient
- Blog: Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions
- Blog: Tight Bounds for the Price of Anarchy of Simultaneous First Price Auctions
- Blog: The Price of Anarchy in ROSCAS with Risk Averse Agents
- Blog: Correlated- and Coarse- equilibria of Single-item auctions
- Blog: Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design: Motivation, Examples, and Lessons Learned
- Blog: An improved welfare guarantee for first-price auctions
- Blog: On the Efficiency of the Walrasian Mechanism
- Blog: First Price Auction is 1-1/e2 Efficient
- Blog: The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Trade
- Blog: Liquid Price of Anarchy
- Blog: Individual Welfare Guarantees in the Autobidding World with Machine-learned Advice
- Blog: Non-Price Equilibria in Markets of Discrete Goods
- Blog: On the Impact of Information Acquisition and Aftermarkets on Auction Efficiency
- Blog: On the Optimal Fixed-Price Mechanism in Bilateral Trade
- Blog: Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions
- Blog: Multi-Unit Bilateral Trade
- Blog: On the Efficiency of All-Pay Mechanisms
- Blog: First Price Auction is 1 - 1/e2 Efficient
- Blog: Learning Competitive Equilibria in Noisy Combinatorial Markets
- Blog: Draft Auctions
- Blog: Approximating Competitive Equilibrium by Nash Welfare
- Blog: Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Welfare Maximization in Two-Sided Markets
- Blog: Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices
- Blog: Max-Min Greedy Matching
- Blog: Polymatroid Prophet Inequalities
- Blog: The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Market Pricing
- Blog: Budget Pacing in Repeated Auctions: Regret and Efficiency without Convergence
- Blog: Budget Feasible Mechanisms Over Graphs
- Blog: Strategic Budget Selection in a Competitive Autobidding World
- Blog: Greedy Algorithms make Efficient Mechanisms
- Blog: Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions
- Blog: Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for Leaderless Blockchain Protocols
- Blog: Simultaneous Auctions are Approximately Revenue-Optimal for Subadditive Bidders
- Blog: Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions with No Overbidding
- Blog: Methodology for Designing Reasonably Expressive Mechanisms with Application to Ad Auctions
- Blog: Sequential auctions and externalities
- Blog: Auto-bidding with Budget and ROI Constrained Buyers
- Blog: Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent Valuations
- Blog: False-Name Bidding and Economic Efficiency in Combinatorial Auctions
- Blog: Platform Equilibrium: Analyzing Social Welfare in Online Market Places
- Blog: Approximately Efficient Bilateral Trade
- Blog: Efficiency of the First-Price Auction in the Autobidding World
- Blog: Two-Price Equilibrium
- Blog: Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization
- Blog: Optimal Crowdsourcing Contests
- Blog: An Improved Welfare Guarantee for First Price Auctions
- Blog: The AND-OR game: Equilibrium Characterization (Working Paper)
- Blog: Autobidders with Budget and ROI Constraints: Efficiency, Regret, and Pacing Dynamics
- Blog: Equilibria in Auctions With Ad Types
- Blog: Computing using Samples: Theoretical Guarantees with the Direct Learning Approach
- Blog: Efficiency of the First-Price Auction in the Autobidding World
- Blog: The Price of Anarchy in Auctions
- Blog: Multi-Unit Auctions with Budget Constraints
- Blog: Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees
- Blog: Descending Price Optimally Coordinates Search
- Blog: The Price of Anarchy in Auctions
- Blog: Mechanism Design for Blockchain Order Books Against Selfish Miners
Showing 60 of 79 papers.
History & citation
Current · Permanent link
- Efficiency of Simple Simultaneous Item Auctions merged into this direction (64% overlap)
Cite this direction
Latest version (a living page):
@misc{lacuna_no_overbidding_assumption_87f9e558,
title = {no-overbidding assumption},
author = {{Lacuna}},
howpublished = {Lacuna research direction},
year = {2026},
url = {https://lacuna.tiptreesystems.com/direction/no-overbidding-assumption/rdr_87f9e558bcca48c7b327508b10e3477e},
note = {Latest version of a living research direction; cite a version for a fixed text. Accessed 2026-11-22},
}This exact version (version 1, frozen text):
@misc{lacuna_no_overbidding_assumption_87f9e558_v1,
title = {no-overbidding assumption},
author = {{Lacuna}},
howpublished = {Lacuna research direction},
year = {2026},
url = {https://lacuna.tiptreesystems.com/direction/no-overbidding-assumption/rdr_87f9e558bcca48c7b327508b10e3477e/v/1},
note = {Version 1, frozen 2026-10-04. Accessed 2026-11-22},
}