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generalization to multi-item auctions
Version 1 of 147 papers47 conceptsfrozen 2026-10-04
Papers in this version
- Blog: On the Complexity of Sequential Posted Pricing
- Blog: Online Mechanism Design with Predictions
- Blog: The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions
- Blog: A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements
- Blog: Diffusion Multi-Unit Auctions with Diminishing Marginal Utility Buyers
- Blog: Budget Optimization for Sponsored Search: Censored Learning in MDPs
- Blog: Multiattribute electronic procurement using goal programming
- Blog: Revenue Maximization for Selling Multiple Correlated Items
- Blog: First Price Auction is 1 – 1 /e<sup>2</sup> Efficient
- Blog: Competitive Auctions for Multiple Digital Goods
- Blog: Model Monotonicity in Autobidding Auctions: When Do Better Predictions Lead to Better Outcomes?
- Blog: Quasi-Proportional Mechanisms: Prior-Free Revenue Maximization
- Blog: Differentially Private Double Spectrum Auction With Approximate Social Welfare Maximization
- Blog: Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
- Blog: A Framework for Single-Item NFT Auction Mechanism Design
- Blog: Approximation Schemes for a Unit-Demand Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries
- Blog: Learning Optimal Auctions with Correlated Value Distributions
- Blog: Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands
- Blog: Benchmark-Tight Approximation Ratio of Simple Mechanism for a Unit-Demand Buyer
- Blog: The Power of Verification for One-Parameter Agents
- Blog: Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions
- Blog: Competing Bandits in Non-Stationary Matching Markets
- Blog: Extreme-Value Theorems for Optimal Multidimensional Pricing
- Blog: Learning to Clear the Market
- Blog: Optimal Pricing in Repeated Posted-Price Auctions with Different Patience of the Seller and the Buyer
- Blog: Social Welfare in One-Sided Matchings: Random Priority and Beyond
- Blog: Multi-category fairness in sponsored search auctions
- Blog: First Price Auction is 1-1/e2 Efficient
- Blog: Sampling and Representation Complexity of Revenue Maximization
- Blog: Multi-Unit Auctions with Budget Constraints
- Blog: Characterizing Truthful Multi-armed Bandit Mechanisms
- Blog: The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
- Blog: Pricing Query Complexity of Revenue Maximization
- Blog: Simple and Approximately Optimal Pricing for Proportional Complementarities
- Blog: Informational overhead of incentive compatibility
- Blog: Fair Stable Matchings Under Correlated Preferences (Student Abstract)
- Blog: SecMDGM: Federated Learning Security Mechanism Based on Multi-Dimensional Auctions
- Blog: Learning to Bid in Contextual First Price Auctions✱
- Blog: Inference from Auction Prices
- Blog: On Simple Mechanisms for Dependent Items
- Blog: On complexity of single-minded auction
- Blog: Mechanism Design Under Approximate Incentive Compatibility
- Blog: Revenue Maximization Mechanisms for an Uninformed Mediator with Communication Abilities
- Blog: Robust Repeated Auctions under Heterogeneous Buyer Behavior
- Blog: Assessing the Robustness of Cremer-McLean with Automated Mechanism Design
- Blog: Efficiency and complexity of price competition among single-product vendors
- Blog: Sybil-Proof Diffusion Auction in Social Networks
History & citation
Current · Permanent link
- This direction split from Revenue Maximization in Multi-Item Auctions (66% overlap)
Cite this direction
Latest version (a living page):
@misc{lacuna_generalization_to_multi_item_auctions_b0a0a833,
title = {generalization to multi-item auctions},
author = {{Lacuna}},
howpublished = {Lacuna research direction},
year = {2026},
url = {https://lacuna.tiptreesystems.com/direction/generalization-to-multi-item-auctions/rdr_b0a0a83388bc4e54ba77572b621b766b},
note = {Latest version of a living research direction; cite a version for a fixed text. Accessed 2026-11-20},
}This exact version (version 1, frozen text):
@misc{lacuna_generalization_to_multi_item_auctions_b0a0a833_v1,
title = {generalization to multi-item auctions},
author = {{Lacuna}},
howpublished = {Lacuna research direction},
year = {2026},
url = {https://lacuna.tiptreesystems.com/direction/generalization-to-multi-item-auctions/rdr_b0a0a83388bc4e54ba77572b621b766b/v/1},
note = {Version 1, frozen 2026-10-04. Accessed 2026-11-20},
}