Zur Monetarisierbarkeit der (weniger personalisierten, aber) gleichwertigen Alternative

Christian Schmid, Cajetan SpäthDatenschutz und Datensicherheit (dud) 2023 · DOI

Abstract

Recent European legal developments, including the ECJ's Meta Platforms ruling and the Digital Markets Act (DMA), require platforms to offer less personalized alternatives (wpA) to their core services. This paper analyzes whether these alternatives can be monetized through subscription fees. We find a significant divergence between the GDPR, which allows "appropriate fees" for privacy, and the DMA, which prohibits Gatekeepers from worsening service conditions. This regulatory tension may ultimately force a shift from ad-supported "free" models to universal paid subscriptions.

Introduction

The "Take-it-or-leave-it" model of the digital economy—where users exchange personal data for free service access—is under intense legal scrutiny. Following the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling in the Meta Platforms case, dominant platforms must provide a "less personalized alternative" (wpA) to ensure user consent is truly "freely given" under the GDPR. Simultaneously, the Digital Markets Act (DMA) imposes specific obligations on "Gatekeepers" to offer equivalent services with less data processing. This analysis explores the legal boundaries of charging users for these privacy-friendly options.

The GDPR and the "Pay or Okay" Model

Under the GDPR, a dominant company is permitted to offer a less personalized alternative for an "appropriate fee." The core requirement is that the fee must not be so prohibitive that it effectively forces the user to consent to data tracking. This allows for a hybrid model where users can choose between a data-intensive "free" service and a paid, privacy-focused one. However, determining what constitutes an "appropriate" fee remains a complex challenge, as there is currently no standardized legal methodology for valuing a user's withheld data.

The DMA's Stricter Constraints for Gatekeepers

The regulatory landscape is significantly more restrictive for companies designated as "Gatekeepers" under the DMA. Article 13(6) of the DMA explicitly prevents Gatekeepers from worsening the "conditions or quality" of a service when a user exercises their rights, such as withholding consent for data cross-use.

If a Gatekeeper offers its standard service for free, introducing a fee for the less-personalized alternative could be viewed as a worsening of conditions. Consequently, Gatekeepers are effectively "boxed in": if the primary service is free, the privacy alternative must also be free. If the primary service is paid, the privacy alternative cannot be more expensive.

Economic Consequences: The End of the "Free" Era

To maintain revenue while complying with the DMA, Gatekeepers are likely to move away from free services entirely. By charging for the base service, they can legally charge for the privacy-friendly version without violating anti-circumvention rules. Meta’s recent introduction of a €13/month ad-free subscription in Europe exemplifies this shift. This regulatory pressure suggests that the era of "free" social media may be coming to an end in the European market.

Conclusion

The ability to monetize privacy-friendly alternatives depends on a platform's regulatory classification. While the GDPR allows for flexible "Pay or Okay" models, the DMA's anti-circumvention clauses impose a much higher bar for Gatekeepers. As platforms adapt to these rules, we expect a widespread transition toward paid subscription models across the digital landscape.

Authors of the Analysis

Author of the legal analysis

Summary updated

BibTeX
@article{schmid2023zur,
  author = {Christian Schmid and Cajetan Späth},
  title = {{Zur Monetarisierbarkeit der (weniger personalisierten, aber) gleichwertigen Alternative}},
  journal = {Datenschutz und Datensicherheit (dud)},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.1007/s11623-023-1856-z},
}
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