XML-based access control languages

Claudio A. Ardagna, Ernesto Damiani, Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati, Pierangela SamaratiInf. Secur. Tech. rep 2004 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper introduces and explains the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML), an XML-based standard for defining and enforcing access control policies in distributed systems. XACML offers a unified, expressive, and extensible way to manage security policies, addressing the complexity and ambiguity of real-world access control requirements.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Managing security in large, distributed, and heterogeneous networked systems is a significant challenge. Specifying and enforcing policies that govern interactions between parties and access to services and resources can be complex, often involving intricate rules derived from various sources like laws, practices, and organizational regulations. Existing approaches can be ambiguous, difficult to translate into machine-enforceable rules, and lack flexibility. The need for a common, standardized, and expressive language to define these security policies is crucial for ensuring consistent and robust access control.

Methods

The paper focuses on XACML as a solution. XACML is an XML-based language designed to express authorization policies. Its core features include:

  • Policy Combination Support: Allows independent specification of policies by different entities and defines how these policies are combined (e.g., using Policy and PolicySet elements).
  • Combining Algorithms: Provides mechanisms (RuleCombiningAlgId, PolicyCombiningAlgId) to reconcile multiple access control decisions into a single outcome.
  • Attribute Support: Enables policies to be based on attributes (properties) of subjects, resources, actions, and the environment, going beyond simple identities.
  • Operators Support: Includes built-in operators for attribute comparison and allows for custom functions.
  • Multiple Subjects: Supports defining policies relevant to more than one subject.
  • Policy Distribution: Allows policies to be defined by different parties and enforced at various points, with the ability to include or refer to other policies.
  • Implementation Independency: Offers an abstraction layer, isolating policy writers from implementation details through a canonical XACML context.
  • Obligations: Allows for specifying actions that must be performed in conjunction with policy enforcement.

The paper also details the XACML data flow model, outlining the roles of key components like the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), Policy Decision Point (PDP), Policy Administration Point (PAP), and Policy Information Point (PIP).

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • XML as a Natural Fit: XML's extensibility and widespread support make it an ideal foundation for a common security policy language, allowing for easy adaptation to diverse requirements.
  • Bridging Real-World Complexity and Machine Enforceability: XACML aims to translate complex, often ambiguous, real-world security policies into clear, deterministic rules that computer systems can enforce.
  • Attribute-Centric Policies: The ability to define policies based on attributes (e.g., user roles, time of day, location) rather than just identities significantly enhances the expressiveness and flexibility of access control.
  • Formal Model for Clarity: XACML's reliance on a formal model for its policy language is essential for ensuring unambiguous semantics, which is critical for deterministic access decisions.
  • Unified Approach: XACML promotes a unified approach to access control, reducing the need for developers to invent new policy languages or tools, and encouraging reusability and the development of multi-application tools.

Key Results

The paper doesn't present quantitative results from experiments but rather focuses on defining and explaining the XACML standard. The key "result" is the specification and detailed description of XACML itself, demonstrating its capabilities through an example. The example illustrates how a high-level policy ("Any member of the moderator group can read the web page www.example.com/forum/private.html") is translated into an XACML policy, request, and response, showing that the user is permitted access.

Limitations and Future Work

The paper acknowledges the inherent trade-off between expressiveness and simplicity in access control languages. While XACML is powerful, managing its complexity can still be a challenge. The authors suggest that XACML's extensibility points allow for future enhancements and adaptation to new requirements. The paper also implicitly highlights the ongoing need for robust tools and implementations to fully leverage XACML's capabilities.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@article{ardagna2004xml,
  author = {Claudio A. Ardagna and Ernesto Damiani and Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati and Pierangela Samarati},
  title = {{XML-based access control languages}},
  journal = {Inf. Secur. Tech. rep},
  year = {2004},
  doi = {10.1016/s1363-4127(04)00030-5},
}
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