Why Do People Who Belong to the Same Clan Engage in the Same Entrepreneurial Activities?—A Case Study on the Influence of Clan Networks on the Content of Farmers’ Entrepreneurship

Jiang Xiao-li, Xiao Ma, Ze-Nian Li, Yongjin Guo, Anxin Xu, Xiaofeng SuFrontiers in Psychology 2022 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper investigates why members of the same Chinese clan often cluster in the exact same industry—a phenomenon known as Tongzongtongye (TZTY). Through a longitudinal case study of a "white fungus" entrepreneurial village, the researchers demonstrate how informal "relational contracts" based on kinship reduce transaction costs and facilitate specialized learning, ultimately creating highly efficient but homogeneous business models.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

In rural China, it is remarkably common to find entire villages or clans dedicated to a single niche industry, such as sacrificial paper, ceramics, or, in this case, the dry goods trade. While economists have long noted that clan networks provide social capital, we know less about the internal mechanisms that drive this industry-wide homogenization.

The authors address a fundamental question: Why does the clan network lead everyone to do the same thing? They argue that in environments where formal market systems and legal protections are still developing, the clan acts as a "ready-made" informal organization that shapes entrepreneurial motivation, learning, and business strategy.

Methods

The researchers employed a single-case longitudinal study focusing on "Q Village" in Fujian Province. This village has a history of entrepreneurship dating back to the 1960s, primarily centered on the sale of white fungus (tremella).

Key methodological steps included:

  • Action Group Categorization: The subjects were divided into the Primary Action Group (the pioneers who first went to Shanghai in the late 70s/early 80s) and the Secondary Action Group (the followers who joined later).
  • Data Collection: The team conducted 18 in-depth interviews with 10 key entrepreneurs, performed field observations during a village history project, and analyzed internal documents like clan genealogies.
  • Grounded Theory Coding: Using Strauss’s programmed root theory, they performed three levels of coding (open, spindle, and selection) to distill 33 first-order concepts into a theoretical framework.

Datasets

As a qualitative social science study, the paper does not use large-scale computational datasets. Instead, it relies on:

  • Primary Interview Data: 700 minutes of recorded interviews.
  • Historical Archives: Clan genealogy records and village entrepreneurial data.
  • Field Notes: Observations from a 2019-2020 field workshop in Q Village.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • The Power of Relational Contracts: In the absence of perfect formal contracts, clan members rely on "relational contracts"—informal, unwritten agreements based on long-term trust and "repeated games." These contracts allow for high flexibility; for example, members can "owe" money for goods without a signed document, knowing the social cost of cheating the clan is too high.
  • Exploratory vs. Exploitative Learning:
    • Pioneers (Primary Group) engage in exploratory learning, transforming intuitive "street smarts" into compiled knowledge about market gaps (e.g., moving from street stalls to supplying trade unions).
  • Followers (Secondary Group) use exploitative learning, imitating the pioneers to reduce "foreseen costs" and "information search costs."
  • Asset Specificity: Because the network is stable, members are willing to invest in "asset-specific" resources (specialized packaging factories or supply chains) that would be too risky in an open, low-trust market.
  • The "Wolf Pack" Effect: The paper describes a transition from individual survival to a "huddled together" model. By sharing information on supply channels and sales tactics, the clan internalizes external risks, making the group more resilient than a lone entrepreneur.

Key Results

The study identifies a three-stage evolution of clan entrepreneurship:

  1. Initial Period: Relational contracts activate dormant labor and capital. Pioneers share "procedural knowledge" (how to get to the market, where to buy paper) to stimulate motivation in others.
  2. Crossroads Period: The clan reduces transaction costs. Pioneers transform intuitive learning into "compilation learning," while followers trigger a "learning effect" that allows them to make proprietary investments with lower risk.
  3. Pattern Maturity: The clan forms a stable, homogeneous business model. In Q Village, this resulted in a "trade union supply model" and an "asset-light" operation where the supply chain is rationally integrated across the clan.

Quantitatively, the paper notes the dramatic economic shift: in 1980, a successful clan member in Shanghai could earn 5,000 yuan per month—a staggering sum compared to the 100 yuan per year earned by those who stayed behind to farm.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Generalizability: As a single-case study of a low-end industry (dry goods), the findings might not apply perfectly to high-tech or capital-intensive sectors.
  • The "Low-End" Trap: The authors acknowledge that TZTY often results in low-value-added industries with high substitutability. When market pressures rise, these farmers-turned-entrepreneurs are easily squeezed out.
  • Future Directions: The authors suggest that future research should look at how to help these clan-based clusters "upgrade" into high-value brands and how local governments can better integrate these informal networks into formal innovation platforms.

Summary updated

Abstract

Farmers' entrepreneurship is a powerful breakthrough for solving the problems associated with "agriculture, rural areas and farmers." Although studies have commonly used the same entrepreneurial activities to analyze farmers' entrepreneurship, its deep economic roots have rarely been investigated. Investigating the internal development mechanism within the same industry is helpful for understanding farmers' entrepreneurship motivation and decision making and is an important point at which to implement regional research and enrich the overall research on farmers' entrepreneurship in the Chinese context. Based on a single-case study in Q Village, Fujian Province, this work identifies the key role played by relational contracts in entrepreneurship groups: reducing transaction costs, promoting investment in asset specificity, and improving contract flexibility. Moreover, this approach is conducive for different action groups in terms of stimulating entrepreneurial motivation in the initial entrepreneurship period and improving entrepreneurship learning ability in the long term. Primary Action Group transforms exploratory intuitive learning into exploratory compilation learning, and Secondary Action Group triggers the learning effect and makes a proprietary investment by utilizing intuitive formulaic learning and compiled formulaic learning, thus reducing unforeseen, contracting and verification costs. During the pattern maturity period, Primary Action Group rationally integrates the supply chain and forms a stable entrepreneurial paradigm, while Secondary Action Group does so to maintain prior information reserves and lower information search, supervised execution, and bargaining decision costs. The value cocreation ability of the same type of commercial modularity is formed, and the whole process of farmers' entrepreneurship is completed. Our results have important implications for policymakers in China and other countries with clans.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{xiaoli2022why,
  author = {Jiang Xiao-li and Xiao Ma and Ze-Nian Li and Yongjin Guo and Anxin Xu and Xiaofeng Su},
  title = {{Why Do People Who Belong to the Same Clan Engage in the Same Entrepreneurial Activities?—A Case Study on the Influence of Clan Networks on the Content of Farmers’ Entrepreneurship}},
  booktitle = {Frontiers in Psychology},
  year = {2022},
  doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2022.873583},
}
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