Who Can Evaluate AI Independently? A Framework for Analysing Evaluation Infrastructure

Sumaya Nur Adan, Joanna Wiaterek, Nourhan Abdelrhim, Sydney Reis, Robert F. Trager, Benjamin Rosman, Marina JirotkaarXiv 2026 · arXiv

This paper tackles a critical but often overlooked question in AI governance: Who actually has the power to evaluate AI? While independent evaluation is hailed as a cornerstone of AI safety, the "plumbing"—the compute, model access, and funding—is concentrated in very few hands.

TL;DR

The authors introduce the PAAI framework (Power, Access, Adequacy, Independence) to analyze how infrastructure arrangements dictate evaluative authority. By studying African AI projects and international safety testing, they demonstrate that simply participating in an evaluation does not grant the independence required for credible, long-term AI governance.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

AI safety depends on third-party "audits" or evaluations to find risks before systems are deployed. However, the resources needed for these evaluations (massive compute clusters and access to proprietary model weights) are controlled by the developers themselves or a few wealthy nations.

This creates a "control gap." Even when researchers from the Global South or smaller labs are invited to participate, they often lack the authority to set the research agenda, run the models themselves, or publish findings without a provider's approval. The paper argues that without infrastructure authority, "independent" evaluation is often an illusion.

Methods

The authors synthesize Science and Technology Studies (STS) and political economy into the PAAI framework, which breaks down evaluation into four dimensions:

  • Power: Divided into Design Authority (who defines the harms and metrics?) and Infrastructure Authority (who controls the compute and model access?).
  • Access: The specific terms of use (e.g., duration of API credits, geographic restrictions).
  • Adequacy: Whether the setup is technically rigorous and contextually fit for the local setting.
  • Independence: The ability to choose targets and publish results without needing "goodwill" from providers.
Figure 1: The PAAI framework. (a) Power has two parts. Design authority decides what is tested and how, and shapes whether the evaluation fits its setting. Infrastructure authority controls the compute, data, funding and model access an evaluation runs on, and sets the terms of Access. Together they determine Independence. Each box gives the question PAAI asks. (b) Who holds each part of Power gives four configurations, each shown with an example from our data.

The researchers applied this framework using structured thematic analysis on 12 African AI evaluation projects and coding the roles of 10 member institutes across three international AI Safety Institute (AISI) joint testing exercises.

Datasets

The paper does not introduce a new machine learning dataset but rather a meta-dataset of evaluation projects:

  • 12 African AI projects (2022–2025): Including benchmarks like AfroBench and Uhura, and domain-specific audits in healthcare.
  • 29 AISI Institute-by-Exercise records: Documenting the roles of countries like Singapore, the UK, the US, and Kenya in global safety testing.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Infrastructure is Authority: The most striking finding is that design authority alone never yielded more than "partial" independence. If you write the test but someone else runs the model, they ultimately control the evaluation's continuity and depth.
  • The Paradox of Participation: Formal inclusion often masks structural exclusion. African actors frequently contribute "essential labor"—like translating prompts or annotating data—while external institutions retain control over the frameworks and analysis.
  • Project-Based Funding is a Bottleneck: Independent evaluation requires standing infrastructure. Relying on one-off grants or expiring API credits (which the authors found in all 12 African cases) prevents the longitudinal monitoring necessary for safety.
  • Framework Co-Design as Governance: When safety frameworks are designed in the West, they often fail to capture local risks (e.g., specific types of fraud prevalent in Kenyan mobile money contexts).

Key Results

The authors identify three recurring configurations of control:

  1. Extractive Collaboration: External leads hold all authority; local actors provide labor/data.
  2. Dependent Innovation: Local actors design the evaluation but rely on precarious, external infrastructure.
  3. Constrained Independence: Local actors hold both design and infrastructure authority but lack the resources to scale.
Figure 2: Who held design and infrastructure authority in each African project, and the independence of African participants, grouped by configuration. Darker cells indicate more African authority or independence. Design authority alone never raised independence above partial.

In the AISI joint testing exercises, a clear divide emerged: the "Leads" (Singapore, UK) ran the models and built the tools, while others (like Kenya) moved from annotation to task design but never achieved documented model execution. This suggests that even in high-level diplomatic networks, infrastructure remains a gatekeeper.

Limitations and Future Work

The study is limited by its reliance on publicly available documentation. Private contract terms for API access or compute grants are often undisclosed, meaning some aspects of "Access" and "Independence" had to be inferred from observable indicators. Furthermore, the authors acknowledge that they cannot always distinguish between a participant choosing a specialized role (like translation) versus being constrained into it by a lack of resources.

Future work will involve fieldwork and interviews with practitioners in Africa and AISI participants to understand how these power dynamics are negotiated behind the scenes.

Summary updated

Abstract

AI evaluation is increasingly central to AI safety and governance, yet taking part in an evaluation does not by itself confer authority over its design, its execution or the resources it depends on. This paper examines how infrastructure arrangements distribute that authority, and so shape who can evaluate AI systems independently. Drawing on Science and Technology Studies, political economy and applied evaluation standards, we introduce PAAI (Power, Access, Adequacy, Independence), a framework for examining who controls evaluation infrastructure, the terms on which it is available, whether it is adequate to the evaluation's purpose and what autonomy it supports. We apply PAAI to twelve African AI evaluation projects (2022-2025) and to the documented roles of all ten member institutes in the three published joint testing exercises of the international network of AI Safety Institutes. We identify three recurring configurations: extractive collaboration, dependent innovation and constrained independence. African actors often contribute data, language expertise and task design while external institutions retain authority over infrastructure and evaluation frameworks; design authority without infrastructure authority never yielded more than partial independence. The joint testing exercises show a similar division among mostly high-income members: the institutes that led each exercise also ran the models, while Kenya, the network's only African member, moved from annotation to task design with no documented model execution. Participation in evaluation does not by itself produce evaluative authority. For evaluation to serve as a credible governance mechanism, access must come with control over priorities, methods, publication and continuity.
BibTeX
@misc{adan2026who,
  author = {Sumaya Nur Adan and Joanna Wiaterek and Nourhan Abdelrhim and Sydney Reis and Robert F. Trager and Benjamin Rosman and Marina Jirotka},
  title = {{Who Can Evaluate AI Independently? A Framework for Analysing Evaluation Infrastructure}},
  year = {2026},
  eprint = {2611.08134},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08134},
}
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