When to Limit Market Entry under Mandatory Purchase

Meryem Essaidi, Kira Goldner, S. Matthew WeinbergarXiv 2020 · arXiv

Abstract

In regulated markets where purchase is mandatory, such as health insurance exchanges, a regulator must balance the benefits of product variety against the intensity of price competition. This paper provides a mathematical framework to determine when limiting market entry increases overall consumer utility. By forcing a "race to the bottom" in pricing, regulatory intervention can counteract the market power providers gain when consumers lack an outside option.

Introduction

In environments like the Affordable Care Act (ACA) Exchanges, consumers are often required to purchase a plan. This "mandatory purchase" condition fundamentally alters market dynamics. While a free market with many providers offers greater variety, it can also lead to higher prices because providers know consumers must buy from someone. This paper explores the "Variety-Price Tradeoff": does the benefit of having more choices outweigh the cost of higher prices?

Theoretical Framework and the MHR+ Condition

The authors employ game theory and Myersonian virtual value theory to analyze market equilibria. They compare a Free Market (where all $n$ providers compete) to a Limited Entry model (where the regulator only permits the $n-1$ lowest-priced providers).

A central technical challenge in these models is ensuring the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium. To address this, the authors introduce MHR+, a stronger version of the standard Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR) property.

Relationship between common distributional assumptions used in the paper.

As illustrated in the figure above, MHR+ encompasses many common distributions like uniform, exponential, and normal distributions, while excluding more extreme cases like the equal revenue distribution. This property is sufficient to guarantee a stable, predictable market equilibrium in the Free Market setting.

Key Insights: The Race to the Bottom

The paper's most striking finding is the "Race to the Bottom" in the Limited Entry scenario. When the regulator commits to kicking out the highest-priced provider, the unique equilibrium results in all providers setting their price to zero (or the marginal cost). Because the "losing" provider earns zero revenue, they are always incentivized to undercut their competitors until the price floor is reached.

The authors derive a "Limit-Entry Condition" based on expected hazard rates. If the distribution of consumer values satisfies this condition, limiting entry is guaranteed to improve consumer utility. Notably, Theorem 1.3 shows that for any MHR distribution with a decreasing density, this condition is satisfied. This suggests that under most standard economic assumptions, restricting entry to $n-1$ providers is socially optimal for consumers.

Conclusion and Future Directions

This research demonstrates that in mandatory purchase markets, the lack of an "outside option" for consumers necessitates active regulatory intervention to curb provider market power. While the current model uses a stylized "kick-out" rule, it opens the door for more complex regulatory designs. Future work could investigate the optimal number of providers to exclude ($k$) and how these results generalize to asymmetric markets where providers have different cost structures or brand appeal.

Summary updated

Abstract

We study a problem inspired by regulated health insurance markets, such as those created by the government in the Affordable Care Act Exchanges or by employers when they contract with private insurers to provide plans for their employees. The market regulator can choose to do nothing, running a Free Market, or can exercise her regulatory power by limiting the entry of providers (decreasing consumer welfare by limiting options, but also decreasing revenue via enhanced competition). We investigate whether limiting entry increases or decreases the utility (welfare minus revenue) of the consumers who purchase from the providers, specifically in settings where the outside option of "purchasing nothing" is prohibitively undesirable. We focus primarily on the case where providers are symmetric. We propose a sufficient condition on the distribution of consumer values for (a) a unique symmetric equilibrium to exist in both markets and (b) utility to be higher with limited entry. (We also establish that these conclusions do not necessarily hold for all distributions, and therefore some condition is necessary.) Our techniques are primarily based on tools from revenue maximization, and in particular Myerson's virtual value theory. We also consider extensions to settings where providers have identical costs for providing plans, and to two providers with an asymmetric distribution.
BibTeX
@misc{essaidi2020when,
  author = {Meryem Essaidi and Kira Goldner and S. Matthew Weinberg},
  title = {{When to Limit Market Entry under Mandatory Purchase}},
  year = {2020},
  eprint = {2002.06326},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.06326},
}
Figure