When HTTPS Meets CDN: A Case of Authentication in Delegated Service

Jinjin Liang, Jian Jiang, Haixin Duan, Kang Li, Tao Wan, Jianping Wu2014 · DOI

Abstract

Content Delivery Network (CDN) and Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) are two popular but independent web technologies, each of which has been well studied individually and independently. This paper provides a systematic study on how these two work together. We examined 20 popular CDN providers and 10,721 of their customer web sites using HTTPS. Our study reveals various problems with the current HTTPS practice adopted by CDN providers, such as widespread use of invalid certificates, private key sharing, neglected revocation of stale certificates, and insecure back-end communication. While some of those problems are operational issues only, others are rooted in the fundamental semantic conflict between the end-to-end nature of HTTPS and the man-in-the-middle nature of CDN involving multiple parties in a delegated service. To address the delegation problem when HTTPS meets CDN, we proposed and implemented a lightweight solution based on DANE (DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities), an emerging IETF protocol complementing the current Web PKI model. Our implementation demonstrates that it is feasible for HTTPS to work with CDN securely and efficiently. This paper intends to provide a context for future discussion within security and CDN community on more preferable solutions.

Introduction

HTTPS was designed for a simple world: a client talks directly to a server, and a certificate proves the server's identity. However, the modern web relies heavily on Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) to improve performance. CDNs act as "surrogate" servers that terminate HTTPS connections closer to the user, breaking the traditional end-to-end security model. This creates a fundamental "semantic conflict" between the end-to-end nature of HTTPS and the man-in-the-middle nature of CDNs.

The Delegation Problem

The core issue is delegation: How can a website owner (Alice) authorize a CDN (Carol) to speak on her behalf to a user (Bob) without compromising security? Currently, site owners are often forced into poor security practices to enable HTTPS over a CDN.

The Private Key Dilemma

One common solution is for site owners to upload their private keys to the CDN. This violates the cardinal rule of public-key cryptography: never share your private key. If the CDN is compromised, every customer's key is at risk.

The current insecure practice of uploading private keys to CDNs

Another approach involves "shared certificates," where the CDN includes the customer's domain in its own certificate using Subject Alternative Names (SAN). This often strips away high-assurance security indicators like Extended Validation (EV) and creates a "Revocation Gap." When a customer leaves a CDN, these shared certificates are rarely revoked, leaving a window for impersonation attacks.

Empirical Measurement and Security Analysis

To quantify the extent of these issues, we surveyed 20 leading CDN providers and scanned 10,721 HTTPS-enabled websites using these services. Our findings were concerning:

  • Widespread Errors: 15% of the surveyed sites triggered browser alerts for invalid certificates.
  • Insecure Back-ends: We tested the "back-end" communication (the link between the CDN and the origin server) for five major providers. All five were insecure—either using plain HTTP or failing to validate the origin's certificate. This makes the "green padlock" in the browser a dangerous illusion for many users.

A Path Forward: DANE-based Delegation

To address these systemic flaws, we propose a delegation mechanism based on DANE (DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities). Instead of sharing private keys, the site owner publishes a DNS record (TLSA) that explicitly links their identity to the CDN’s certificate.

Proposed delegation model where the CDN provides a delegation token to the browser

Our Proof of Concept (PoC) implementation, including a Firefox extension, demonstrates that a browser can verify a delegation path without the site owner sharing a private key. This preserves the "end-to-end" spirit of HTTPS while allowing for the necessary "middle-man" functionality of a CDN.

Conclusion

The intersection of HTTPS and CDNs has created an identity crisis for the modern web. While current practices often compromise security for performance, our study shows that secure delegation is possible. The primary hurdle for DANE-based solutions is the slow adoption of DNSSEC. However, as the web continues to evolve, reconciling the end-to-end security of HTTPS with the distributed nature of CDNs remains a critical priority for the security community.

Summary updated

Abstract

Content Delivery Network (CDN) and Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) are two popular but independent web technologies, each of which has been well studied individually and independently. This paper provides a systematic study on how these two work together. We examined 20 popular CDN providers and 10,721 of their customer web sites using HTTPS. Our study reveals various problems with the current HTTPS practice adopted by CDN providers, such as widespread use of invalid certificates, private key sharing, neglected revocation of stale certificates, and insecure back-end communication. While some of those problems are operational issues only, others are rooted in the fundamental semantic conflict between the end-to-end nature of HTTPS and the man-in-the-middle nature of CDN involving multiple parties in a delegated service. To address the delegation problem when HTTPS meets CDN, we proposed and implemented a lightweight solution based on DANE (DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities), an emerging IETF protocol complementing the current Web PKI model. Our implementation demonstrates that it is feasible for HTTPS to work with CDN securely and efficiently. This paper intends to provide a context for future discussion within security and CDN community on more preferable solutions.
BibTeX
@misc{liang2014when,
  author = {Jinjin Liang and Jian Jiang and Haixin Duan and Kang Li and Tao Wan and Jianping Wu},
  title = {{When HTTPS Meets CDN: A Case of Authentication in Delegated Service}},
  year = {2014},
  doi = {10.1109/sp.2014.12},
}
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