When Data Manipulation Meets Attack Goals: An In-depth Survey of Attacks for VLMs

Aobotao Dai, Xinyu Ma, Lei Chen, Songze Li, Lin WangarXiv 2025 · DOI · arXiv

As Vision-Language Models (VLMs) like GPT-4V and LLaVA become the "eyes and brains" of everything from autonomous cars to household robots, their security is no longer just a theoretical concern—it’s a safety imperative. A new survey provides a deep dive into how these multimodal models can be broken, deceived, or exploited.

TL;DR

This research provides a comprehensive taxonomy of attacks on Vision-Language Models (VLMs), categorizing them by both the attacker's goals (Jailbreak, Camouflage, Exploitation) and their methods (Visual Perturbation, Typography, Deceptive Prompts). It highlights how the integration of text and vision creates unique "cross-modal" vulnerabilities that traditional unimodal defenses are ill-equipped to handle.

The Problem: A Fragmented Security Landscape

While the vulnerabilities of text-only (LLM) and vision-only models are well-documented, VLMs sit at a complex intersection. They don't just process two types of data; they align them into a shared latent space.

Existing research has been fragmented, often focusing narrowly on "jailbreaking" or specific architectures. There hasn't been a unified framework explaining the relationship between how an attacker manipulates data and what they intend to achieve. Furthermore, the volume of research is exploding—with over 2,600 papers on VLM attacks published in 2024 alone—making a structured survey essential for the community.

Methods: The Attack Taxonomy

The core of the survey is a two-dimensional taxonomy that maps data manipulation techniques to specific malicious objectives.

Overview of the VLM attack landscape, mapping malicious inputs to specific attack goals.

1. Attack Goals (The "What")

  • Jailbreak: Bypassing safety filters to force the model to generate prohibited content, such as instructions for illegal acts or NSFW imagery.
  • Camouflage: Deceiving the model into making incorrect "common sense" judgments. This includes Perceptual Deception (misidentifying objects) and Operational Hijacking (e.g., causing an autonomous vehicle to behave dangerously based on a visual trigger).
  • Exploitation: A newer class of "Denial of Service" attack. By crafting specific inputs, attackers force the model into high-latency generation loops, skyrocketing energy and compute costs for the provider.

2. Data Manipulation (The "How")

  • Visual Perturbation: Adding noise to an image, either globally (subtle noise) or via patch-based methods (visible deceptive stickers).
  • Gradient-Driven Prompts: Using model gradients to find precise character sequences that trigger malicious outputs.
  • Human-Like Deceptive Prompts: "Social engineering" for AI, using role-playing or emotional appeals to bypass safety guardrails.
  • Typography: A VLM-specific vulnerability where malicious instructions are printed inside an image. Since many filters only check text strings, the model "reads" and executes the command from the visual input.

Key Insights: The Multimodal Advantage

  • Stealth through Modality: Attackers can hide intent in one modality to bypass defenses in another. A "Typography" attack uses the visual encoder to sneak text past a text-only safety filter.
  • Intelligence vs. Risk: Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are more susceptible to complex, human-like deceptive prompts because of their deeper understanding of conversational context.
  • The Cost of Exploitation: Beyond what the AI says, "Exploitation" attacks target the infrastructure. Forcing a model into a "Chain-of-Thought" loop can effectively drain server resources.
  • Defense Mismatch: Current defenses are often "unimodal." A system might have robust text and image filters independently but fail to detect the logical mismatch when they are combined maliciously.

The survey highlights critical trends in the field, most notably the rapid escalation of interest and the high degree of attack transferability. Attacks developed on open-source models often successfully compromise closed-source systems like GPT-4V.

The exponential growth in VLM security research publications from 2022 to 2024.

Limitations and Future Directions

  • Standardized Metrics: The field lacks unified evaluation criteria. What constitutes a "successful jailbreak" varies between studies, complicating model comparisons.
  • Physical World Safety: Most research is currently digital-only. There is an urgent need to study how these attacks manifest in the physical world, such as malicious clothing designed to deceive security systems.
  • Embodied AI: As VLMs power robotics, security failures transition from digital errors to physical risks. The survey calls for dedicated research into the safety of "Embodied AI."

The authors advocate for a unified, comprehensive benchmark testing four dimensions: Effectiveness, Stealthiness, Transferability, and Efficiency.

Summary updated

Abstract

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have gained considerable prominence in recent years due to their remarkable capability to effectively integrate and process both textual and visual information. This integration has significantly enhanced performance across a diverse spectrum of applications, such as scene perception and robotics. However, the deployment of VLMs has also given rise to critical safety and security concerns, necessitating extensive research to assess the potential vulnerabilities these VLM systems may harbor. In this work, we present an in-depth survey of the attack strategies tailored for VLMs. We categorize these attacks based on their underlying objectives - namely jailbreak, camouflage, and exploitation - while also detailing the various methodologies employed for data manipulation of VLMs. Meanwhile, we outline corresponding defense mechanisms that have been proposed to mitigate these vulnerabilities. By discerning key connections and distinctions among the diverse types of attacks, we propose a compelling taxonomy for VLM attacks. Moreover, we summarize the evaluation metrics that comprehensively describe the characteristics and impact of different attacks on VLMs. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of promising future research directions that could further enhance the robustness and safety of VLMs, emphasizing the importance of ongoing exploration in this critical area of study. To facilitate community engagement, we maintain an up-to-date project page, accessible at: https://github.com/AobtDai/VLM_Attack_Paper_List.
BibTeX
@misc{dai2025when,
  author = {Aobotao Dai and Xinyu Ma and Lei Chen and Songze Li and Lin Wang},
  title = {{When Data Manipulation Meets Attack Goals: An In-depth Survey of Attacks for VLMs}},
  year = {2025},
  eprint = {2502.06390},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.06390},
}
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