Voluntary Food Safety Disclosure and Government Grants: The Greater Food Approach Perspective

Wentai Bi, Jie Huan, Peihang Zhang, Xudong Guo, Qi Qi, Yuan LiangFood 2025 · DOI

TL;DR

This study reveals that companies voluntarily disclosing food safety information tend to receive more government grants, acting as a "resource acquisition effect." However, this benefit is short-lived, especially if the disclosure is merely performative ("not what it says on the tin"), and market attention can significantly dampen this effect.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

In China, food safety is a critical concern, and governments are increasingly focused on its oversight. Companies are encouraged to disclose food safety information, but the effectiveness and sincerity of this disclosure, particularly in influencing government resource allocation (like grants), remain unclear. The paper addresses the question of whether voluntary food safety disclosures genuinely lead to increased government support, or if they are merely a strategic tool for companies to gain favor, especially in the context of the "greater food approach" which emphasizes holistic food system governance. It also investigates the longevity of these benefits and the role of external market scrutiny.

Methods

The researchers employed a quantitative approach using panel data from listed food companies in China between 2008 and 2022. They utilized a fixed-effects model to analyze the relationship between voluntary food safety disclosure and government grants, controlling for various firm-specific and macroeconomic factors. To address potential endogeneity, they also employed propensity-score matching (PSM) and a two-stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental variables method. The study also explored the moderating effect of market attention (through research reports and analyst attention) and examined heterogeneity in grant types and firm sizes.

Datasets

The study utilized data from A-share listed food companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2022. Disclosure data was manually collected from annual and social responsibility reports. Other variables were sourced from the China Economic and Financial Research Database (CSMAR). No new benchmarks were introduced; rather, existing databases were leveraged.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Disclosure as a Grant Magnet: Companies that voluntarily disclose food safety information are more likely to receive government grants. This suggests that disclosure acts as a positive signal to governments, potentially indicating good corporate citizenship and risk management.
  • The "Short-Term" Illusion: The positive effect of disclosure on grants is not sustainable if the disclosure is superficial or misleading ("not what it says on the tin"). This implies that governments may be initially swayed, but the long-term reality of a firm's food safety practices will eventually surface.
  • Market Scrutiny as a Dampener: Increased attention from securities analysts and research reports significantly weakens the positive relationship between food safety disclosure and government grants. This suggests that market oversight can help governments better discern genuine efforts from performative ones.
  • Small Firms and Ordinary Cities Benefit More: The positive association between disclosure and grants is more pronounced for small-scale firms and those located in ordinary cities. This could be because these firms have fewer alternative avenues for visibility and government support, making disclosure a more impactful strategy.
  • Revenue-Related Grants are Key: The benefits of disclosure are concentrated in revenue-related government grants, suggesting that companies use this strategy to improve their financial standing and address short-term constraints.

Key Results

The baseline regression analysis confirmed that voluntary food safety disclosure has a significant positive impact on both the level and intensity of government grants (Hypothesis 1 verified). However, the analysis of "inconsistent" disclosure over longer time windows (3- and 5-year terms) showed that the resource-acquisition effect is not significant, supporting Hypothesis 2 that these effects are short-term. The moderating effect of market attention was found to be significantly negative, indicating that market scrutiny weakens the positive impact of disclosure on grants. Heterogeneity analysis revealed that the positive association is stronger for small-scale firms and in ordinary cities, and primarily linked to revenue-related grants.

Limitations and Future Work

The authors acknowledge that the study's focus on China limits generalizability to regions with different regulatory and market environments. They also note that relying solely on annual reports and official data might not fully capture the nuances of corporate behavior and information manipulation. Future research could benefit from cross-country comparisons, longitudinal analyses, and alternative data sources, potentially employing big data crawlers to include unlisted companies. Optimizing the collection of voluntary food safety disclosure indicators is also suggested.

Summary updated

Abstract

Voluntary information disclosure is an important bridge between firms and external stakeholders. Based on the data of listed food companies from 2008 to 2022, this study examines the impact of voluntary food safety information disclosure on the government's resource allocation decisions from the perspective of the greater food approach. Such disclosure has a resource-acquisition effect and can significantly increase the level of government grants. The aforementioned effect that is "not what it says on the tin" is only effective in the short term and does not allow for sustained benefits to be realized. The mechanism test established that the positive relationship between disclosure and government grants is significantly inhibited by market attention. Further research finds that this positive association is more pronounced among small-scale and ordinary urban firms, with the types concentrated in revenue-related government grants. This research enriches the literature on the economic consequences of voluntary disclosure and provides empirical evidence for the government to accurately screen firms' food safety status and information manipulation.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{bi2025voluntary,
  author = {Wentai Bi and Jie Huan and Peihang Zhang and Xudong Guo and Qi Qi and Yuan Liang},
  title = {{Voluntary Food Safety Disclosure and Government Grants: The Greater Food Approach Perspective}},
  booktitle = {Food},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.1002/fsn3.70765},
}
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