Value-Added Service Investment and Pricing Strategies of a Multilateral Distribution Platform Considering User-Homing in a Duopoly

Chuan Zhang, Huimin Ma, Min Xiao, Yu‐Xin Tian, Ling-Wei FanIEEE Access 2019 · DOI

Abstract

In the competitive landscape of multilateral distribution platforms, such as food delivery or ride-sharing apps, strategic decisions regarding pricing and value-added services (VAS) are critical. This paper investigates how user-homing behavior—whether users stick to one platform or use multiple—affects these strategies in a duopoly. By combining utility theory and the Hotelling model, we compare two scenarios: Situation S (all users are single-homing) and Situation M (consumers are single-homing, while advertisers and delivery staff are multi-homing). Our findings reveal that platforms achieve higher profits in Situation M by increasing consumer transaction fees while lowering fees for delivery staff and advertisers. Furthermore, we identify a specific cost threshold for VAS investment, below which investing in extra features becomes suboptimal.

Introduction

Modern distribution platforms operate in complex ecosystems involving at least three distinct groups: consumers, service providers (delivery staff), and advertisers. Managing these platforms requires balancing cross-group network externalities—where the value for one group depends on the size of another. For instance, more delivery drivers attract more consumers, but excessive advertising might detract from the consumer experience.

To maintain a competitive edge, platforms often invest in value-added services (VAS), such as loyalty programs or integrated financial tools. However, the effectiveness of these investments and the optimal pricing for each group are heavily influenced by "user-homing" behavior. This study provides a theoretical framework to navigate these multi-sided market dynamics.

Methodology and Modeling

The research employs a mathematical approach combining two foundational economic models:

  1. The Hotelling Model: This is used to simulate competition between two symmetric platforms. It treats user preferences as a spatial distribution, where the "distance" between a user and a platform represents their brand loyalty or psychological preference.
  2. Utility Theory: This calculates the demand from each group based on fees, the quality of value-added services, and the network effects generated by other groups.

The study compares two primary market structures:

  • Situation S (Single-homing): A restrictive market where every consumer, delivery person, and advertiser uses only one platform.
  • Situation M (Partial Multi-homing): A more realistic market where consumers remain loyal to one app, but delivery staff and advertisers operate across multiple platforms simultaneously.

Optimal strategies were derived using first-order conditions and validated through numerical simulations to observe how shifts in marginal costs and network strength impact platform behavior.

Key Strategic Insights

The Multi-homing Profit Paradox

A significant finding of this research is that platforms are generally more profitable when delivery staff and advertisers multi-home (Situation M) than when they are exclusive (Situation S). When these groups are shared across platforms, the intense competitive pressure to "capture" them exclusively is reduced. This allows platforms to stabilize their ecosystem and extract more value from the consumer side.

Pricing Shifts and Subsidization

The study highlights a clear shift in pricing logic between the two scenarios:

  • Consumer Transaction Fees: These are consistently higher in Situation M. Since delivery and advertising sides are shared, the platform leverages its exclusive relationship with consumers to generate revenue.
  • Service Fees: Delivery and advertising fees are higher in Situation S. In an exclusive market, the platform has more monopoly power over its providers and advertisers. In Situation M, these fees are lowered to ensure the shared pool of providers remains active on the platform.

The VAS Investment Threshold

Investing in value-added services is not a universal solution. The model identifies a marginal cost threshold for VAS. If the cost of providing these services is too low, they fail to create a significant competitive advantage (a "moat"). Conversely, if the cost is too high, the investment yields diminishing returns. Platforms must find the "sweet spot" where the service quality significantly boosts user utility without overextending capital.

Conclusion

For platform managers, this research suggests that the "open" nature of the gig economy—where drivers and advertisers are not bound to a single app—is not necessarily a threat to profitability. In fact, it can lead to a more sustainable profit model if transaction fees for consumers are adjusted accordingly. Strategic investment in value-added services should be guided by the marginal cost of those services and the specific homing behaviors of the platform's user base. Future research may expand these findings by looking at intra-group competition and subscription-based membership models.

Summary updated

Abstract

In reality, there are many multilateral distribution platforms that compete with each other. There are differences in user-homing: some users belong to only one platform, while some belong to multiple platforms. In addition, to attract more consumers, these platforms often invest in value-added services (VASs). In this paper, combining utility theory and Hoteling model, we investigate the VAS investment and pricing strategies of a multilateral distribution platform with considerations of user-homing and cross-group network externalities in a duopoly. We compare two universal situations: situation <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">${S}$ </tex-math></inline-formula> (all consumers, advertisers and delivery staff are single-homing) and situation <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">${M}$ </tex-math></inline-formula> (the consumers are single-homing while the advertisers and the delivery staff are partial multi-homing). The main results are as follows: 1) the optimal transaction fee under situation <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">${M}$ </tex-math></inline-formula> is higher than that under situation <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">${S}$ </tex-math></inline-formula> ; 2) the optimal delivery fee and advertising fee under situation <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">${S}$ </tex-math></inline-formula> are higher than those under situation <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">${M}$ </tex-math></inline-formula> ; 3) there is a threshold of the marginal VAS investment cost in both two situations, below which no VAS investing is the optimal choice; and 4) the optimal profits under situation <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">${M}$ </tex-math></inline-formula> are higher than those under situation <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">${S}$ </tex-math></inline-formula> .
BibTeX
@inproceedings{zhang2019value,
  author = {Chuan Zhang and Huimin Ma and Min Xiao and Yu‐Xin Tian and Ling-Wei Fan},
  title = {{Value-Added Service Investment and Pricing Strategies of a Multilateral Distribution Platform Considering User-Homing in a Duopoly}},
  booktitle = {IEEE Access},
  year = {2019},
  doi = {10.1109/access.2019.2929828},
}
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