User Profiles: The Achilles' Heel of Web Browsers

Dolière Francis Somé, Moaz Airan, Zakir Durumeric, Cristian-Alexandru StaicuarXiv 2025 · DOI · arXiv

TL;DR

This paper reveals that modern web browsers store a wealth of sensitive user data in easily accessible profile folders on disk, making them vulnerable to file system attackers. The authors demonstrate how attackers can exploit this to steal credentials, hijack sessions, and even bypass HTTPS, highlighting a critical security gap that needs urgent attention from browser vendors.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Web browsers are the gateway to our online lives, and significant effort has gone into securing them against web-based attacks. However, this paper shifts the focus to a less-explored threat: attackers who gain access to the user's file system. While traditionally considered too powerful to be a primary concern for browser security, the authors argue that this threat model is becoming increasingly relevant due to new browser features and evolving attack landscapes. Specifically, they investigate how sensitive data stored in browser profiles (like cookies, passwords, extensions, and permissions) can be compromised by attackers with file system access, even without compromising the browser's core security mechanisms.

Methods

The authors conducted a systematic security study of browser profiles across major browsers (Chromium-based, Firefox, Safari). Their methodology involved:

  • Profile Analysis: Examining the contents of browser profile folders to identify sensitive data and the security mechanisms (or lack thereof) protecting them.
  • Attack Simulation: Developing and demonstrating various attack scenarios against these profiles, ranging from read-only data exfiltration to full profile manipulation.
  • Exploiting New APIs: Specifically investigating the File System Access (FSA) API, a recent Chromium feature, to see how it could be misused by web attackers to interact with the file system.
  • User Study: Conducting a user study to assess the susceptibility of users to social engineering tactics that could lead them to grant malicious websites access to their file system via the FSA API.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The authors primarily used their own browser profiles and simulated attack scenarios.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Ubiquitous Vulnerability: Except for the Tor Browser, most modern browsers store highly sensitive data in their profile folders with minimal to no integrity or confidentiality controls.
  • Bypassing Encryption: Even when browsers encrypt sensitive data like passwords and cookies, attackers with write access to the profile folder can bypass this encryption by manipulating how the encrypted data is stored and associated with websites.
  • The File System Access (FSA) API is a Double-Edged Sword: While intended for legitimate file system interactions, the FSA API, particularly its blocklist and permission model, has exploitable weaknesses that allow remote web attackers to access and modify browser profiles.
  • Social Engineering is Key: The FSA API attacks often require user interaction, making social engineering tactics crucial for attackers to trick users into granting the necessary permissions.
  • Cross-Browser Attacks: Vulnerabilities in the FSA API's implementation or blocklist can enable an attacker using one browser (e.g., Chromium) to compromise the profiles of other browsers installed on the same system.
  • Browser Vendors' Disregard: The authors highlight a concerning trend where some browser vendors consider file system attackers "out of scope" or the operating system's responsibility, despite introducing APIs that bridge the gap between web and file system access.

Key Results

  • Demonstrated Attacks: The paper details successful end-to-end attacks including:
  • Hijacking Firefox browsers.
  • Installing malicious extensions in Chromium browsers.
  • Bypassing encryption for cookies and saved login passwords.
  • Installing malicious root certificate authorities to enable Man-in-the-Middle (MiTM) attacks.
  • Silently enabling access to cameras, microphones, and GPS.
  • User Study Findings: Approximately 90% of participants downloaded a questionnaire as a ZIP file, and a significant portion (60%) uploaded their responses using the FSA API, indicating a willingness to grant file system access without fully understanding the risks.
  • FSA API Weaknesses: The authors identified specific flaws in the FSA API's blocklist and path resolution that allow attackers to access sensitive directories, including browser profile folders.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Not Exhaustive: The authors acknowledge that their study did not cover every file within browser profiles, and more sophisticated attacks might exist.
  • Performance and Usability Trade-offs: Implementing robust security measures like full profile encryption could introduce performance overhead and impact usability (e.g., frequent password prompts).
  • Browser Vendor Attitudes: The authors note that some vendors are still hesitant to fully embrace the file system attacker threat model, viewing it as an OS responsibility.

Future Work Suggestions:

  • Browser Vendors: Implement stronger encryption for entire profile folders, machine-bound profiles, and more robust integrity checks for extensions.
  • Operating Systems: Provide better mechanisms for signed apps to manage app data securely.
  • Users: Increased education on the risks associated with granting file system access to websites.
  • Further Research: Explore more advanced encryption schemes, investigate the trade-offs between security and usability, and continue to push for a more comprehensive threat model that includes file system attackers.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@misc{some2025user,
  author = {Dolière Francis Somé and Moaz Airan and Zakir Durumeric and Cristian-Alexandru Staicu},
  title = {{User Profiles: The Achilles' Heel of Web Browsers}},
  year = {2025},
  eprint = {2504.17692},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.17692},
}

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