Universal Implicatures and Free Choice Effects: Experimental Data

Emmanuel ChemlaSemantics 2009 · DOI

Abstract

Universal inferences like (i) have been taken as evidence for a local/syntactic treatment of scalar implicatures (i.e. theories where the enrichment of "some" into "some but not all" can happen sub-sententially): (i) Everybody read some of the books --> Everybody read [some but not all the books]. In this paper, I provide experimental evidence which casts doubt on this argument. The counter-argument relies on a new set of data involving free choice inferences (a sub-species of scalar implicatures) and negative counterparts of (i), namely sentences with the quantifier "no" instead of "every". The results show that the globalist account of scalar implicatures is incomplete (mainly because of free choice inferences) but that the distribution of universal inferences made available by the localist move remains incomplete as well (mainly because of the negative cases).

doi:10.3765/sp.2.2

Introduction

The mechanism behind scalar implicatures (SIs)—inferences where a term like "some" is interpreted as "some but not all"—remains a central debate in linguistics. Two primary camps exist:

  1. Globalist (neo-Gricean) view: Implicatures are pragmatic inferences derived from the entire sentence. If a speaker says "some," and "all" would have been more informative and relevant, the listener infers "not all."
  2. Localist view: Implicatures are generated by a grammatical operator (similar to a silent "only") that can be embedded within the syntactic structure of a sentence.

Localists often point to "universal inferences" as proof of their theory. For instance, "Every student read some of the books" is often interpreted as "No student read all of the books." Localists argue this is easily explained by embedding their operator under the universal quantifier "every." Globalists, conversely, find these inferences harder to derive. This paper investigates whether experimental data supports the localist prediction, particularly when considering negative environments and free choice (FC) effects.

Experimental Methodology

To test these theoretical predictions, a behavioral experiment was conducted with 16 native French speakers with no formal linguistics background. Participants were presented with sentence-inference pairs and asked to rate the strength of the inference on a continuous scale using a red slider. This magnitude estimation technique allows for a more nuanced measurement of human intuition than binary "yes/no" responses.

The experiment utilized a 2x2x2 factorial design:

  • Inference Type: Scalar Implicature (SI) vs. Free Choice (FC).
  • Environment: Positive (using "every") vs. Negative (using "no").
  • Domain: Individual (e.g., "John") vs. Universal (e.g., "every student").

Key Findings and Discussion

The Failure of Localist Asymmetry

A core prediction of localist theories is a mathematical asymmetry: universal inferences should be robust in positive contexts ("Every student...") but absent or significantly different in negative contexts ("No student..."). However, the experimental results showed no such interaction. The strength of inferences in positive and negative environments was statistically indistinguishable ($F < 1$). This lack of asymmetry presents a significant challenge to the localist argument for universal inferences.

Divergence Between SI and FC

The study revealed a sharp distinction between standard scalar implicatures and free choice inferences. Universal SIs (e.g., "Every student read some" $\rightarrow$ "No student read all") were found to be relatively weak compared to their individual counterparts. In contrast, universal FC inferences (e.g., "Every student is allowed to have an apple or a banana" $\rightarrow$ "Every student can choose either") were remarkably robust, matching the strength of individual-level FC inferences. A direct statistical comparison confirmed that universal SI inferences are significantly weaker than universal FC inferences ($p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .36$).

Challenges for Both Theories

The data suggests that neither the globalist nor the localist framework is currently sufficient:

  • Globalist Struggle: The high strength of universal free choice inferences is difficult for globalist models to predict, as they typically do not expect these inferences to arise in such configurations.
  • Localist Struggle: The failure to find the predicted positive/negative asymmetry undermines the primary motivation for the localist account of universal inferences.

Conclusion

The experimental evidence indicates that the distribution and strength of universal inferences do not align perfectly with either major theoretical camp. While free choice inferences are surprisingly robust, standard universal scalar implicatures are weaker than previously assumed, and neither shows the environmental asymmetry predicted by grammatical accounts.

One limitation of this study is the explicit nature of the task; conscious introspection on logical inferences might differ from natural, spontaneous conversation. Future work must seek a unified framework that can account for these findings alongside related phenomena like neg-raising and homogeneity presuppositions.

Summary updated

Abstract

Universal inferences like (i) have been taken as evidence for a local/syntactic treatment of scalar implicatures (i.e. theories where the enrichment of "some" into "some but not all" can happen sub-sententially): (i) Everybody read some of the books --> Everybody read [some but not all the books]. In this paper, I provide experimental evidence which casts doubt on this argument. The counter-argument relies on a new set of data involving free choice inferences (a sub-species of scalar implicatures) and negative counterparts of (i), namely sentences with the quantifier "no" instead of "every". The results show that the globalist account of scalar implicatures is incomplete (mainly because of free choice inferences) but that the distribution of universal inferences made available by the localist move remains incomplete as well (mainly because of the negative cases). doi:10.3765/sp.2.2 BibTeX info
BibTeX
@inproceedings{chemla2009universal,
  author = {Emmanuel Chemla},
  title = {{Universal Implicatures and Free Choice Effects: Experimental Data}},
  booktitle = {Semantics},
  year = {2009},
  doi = {10.3765/sp.2.2},
}
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