Understanding Data Poisoning Attacks for RAG: Insights and Algorithms
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Abstract
Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved success across various domains but also exhibit problematic issues, such as hallucinations. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) effectively alleviates these problems by incorporating external information to improve the factual accuracy of LLM-generated content. However, recent studies reveal that RAG systems are vulnerable to adversarial poisoning attacks, where attackers manipulate retrieval systems by poisoning the data corpus used for retrieval. These attacks raise serious safety concerns, as they can easily bypass existing defenses. In this work, we address these safety issues by first providing insights into the factors contributing to successful attacks. In particular, we show that more effective poisoning attacks tend to occur along directions where the clean data distribution exhibits small variances. Based on these insights, we propose two strategies. First, we introduce a new defense, named DRS (Directional Relative Shifts), which examines shifts along those directions where effective attacks are likely to occur. Second, we develop a new attack algorithm to generate more stealthy poisoning data (i.e., less detectable) by regularizing the poisoning data’s DRS. We conducted extensive experiments across multiple application scenarios, including RAG Agent and dense passage retrieval for Q&A, to demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed methods.
BibTeX
@misc{xian2025understanding,
author = {Xun Xian and Tong Wang and Liwen You and Yanjun Qi},
title = {{Understanding Data Poisoning Attacks for RAG: Insights and Algorithms}},
year = {2025},
url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=2aL6gcFX7q},
howpublished = {OpenReview},
note = {Submitted to ICLR 2025},
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