Tradeoffs between Incentive Mechanisms in Boolean Games

Vadim Levit, Zohar Komarovsky, Tal Grinshpoun, Amnon MeiselsIJCAI 2015

Abstract

Boolean games provide a framework for modeling strategic interactions among agents with logical goals. However, these games often lack a Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE), leading to system instability. This paper investigates two incentive mechanisms—taxation and side payments—designed to nudge agents toward stable outcomes. We demonstrate that taxation is a strictly more powerful mechanism than side payments and provide a distributed algorithm to calculate optimal incentive structures. Experimental results show that while side payments are less versatile, both mechanisms require minimal intervention costs to achieve stability.

Introduction

In a Boolean game, agents control sets of propositional variables and aim to satisfy specific logical formulas. Because agents' goals are often interdependent and conflicting, a Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE)—a state where no agent can benefit by unilaterally changing their strategy—is not guaranteed. To resolve this, external or internal incentives can be applied to modify the game's payoff structure.

Incentive Mechanisms: Taxation vs. Side Payments

Two primary methods for inducing stability are explored:

  1. Taxation: An external principal imposes costs on specific actions, effectively reshaping the "cost landscape" of the game.
  2. Side Payments: Agents engage in peer-to-peer transfers, paying others to adopt specific strategies.

A key theoretical contribution of this work is the hierarchy proof. We mathematically demonstrate that side payments are a "weaker" mechanism than taxation. Any outcome that can be stabilized through side payments can also be stabilized via taxation. However, the converse is not true. Side payments are constrained by a "budget" requirement: the agents benefiting from a state must be able to afford the compensation required by those who lose out. Taxation, being an external modification, does not face this internal liquidity constraint.

Experimental Evaluation

To evaluate these mechanisms, we conducted experiments on synthetically generated social-network-based Boolean games using the Erdős-Rényi model, with agent counts ranging from 6 to 20.

Mechanism Coverage

The experiments confirmed the theoretical hierarchy. Taxation was able to secure a PNE in 100% of the test cases designed for stabilization. In contrast, side payments succeeded in approximately 80% of those same cases, with the success rate slightly declining as the number of agents increased.

Figure 1: Comparison of the success rate (percentage of games reaching PNE) between taxation and side payments as the number of agents increases.

Intervention Costs

Despite the difference in coverage, both mechanisms proved to be highly efficient. The "overall cost change" required to stabilize the games was remarkably low, consistently remaining below 6% of the original game costs. Interestingly, as the number of agents in the network increased, the relative cost required for stabilization tended to decrease, suggesting that stability is "cheap" in larger, more complex social structures where only a few "bottleneck" agents require incentives.

Figure 2: The percentage of cost required to stabilize the game relative to the number of agents.

Computational Complexity

Finding the minimal side payments is modeled as an Asymmetric Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem (ADCOP). We utilized the k-ary SyncABB-1ph distributed search algorithm to find optimal transfer functions. While the computational load grows exponentially with the number of agents—confirming the NP-Hard nature of the problem—the choice of mechanism (taxation vs. side payments) did not significantly change the runtime of the search algorithm.

Conclusion

Taxation offers a more robust tool for stabilizing Boolean games than side payments due to its lack of internal budget constraints. However, in scenarios where a central authority is absent, side payments remain a viable and cost-effective alternative for achieving Pure Nash Equilibrium in the majority of cases. Future work will explore hybrid models and dynamic goal structures to better reflect real-world social network evolution.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@inproceedings{levit2015tradeoffs,
  author = {Vadim Levit and Zohar Komarovsky and Tal Grinshpoun and Amnon Meisels},
  title = {{Tradeoffs between Incentive Mechanisms in Boolean Games}},
  booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year = {2015},
}

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