Trade Credit Insurance for the Capital-Constrained Supplier

Jing Qin, Kun Qin, Yuxiang Cheng, Desheng WuSustainability 2022 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper investigates how trade credit insurance affects capital-constrained suppliers in supply chains. Surprisingly, it finds that for suppliers with insufficient capital, trade credit insurance can actually reduce trade volume and retailer profits, contradicting previous research. However, for well-capitalized suppliers, insurance consistently boosts trade.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

In global trade, trade credit—where a seller allows a buyer to pay later—is ubiquitous, facilitating billions of dollars in transactions. However, this creates risk for suppliers: buyers might default. Trade credit insurance is a tool to mitigate this risk. While much research focuses on the benefits of insurance for trade expansion, this paper zeroes in on a specific, yet common, scenario: a capital-constrained supplier. These suppliers have limited funds to both produce goods and potentially cover losses if a buyer defaults. The paper asks: how does trade credit insurance impact such suppliers, and how should they strategically allocate their limited capital between production and insurance? This is crucial because many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) operate under such constraints.

Methods

The authors employ a Stackelberg game model, where the supplier is the leader and the retailer is the follower. This means the supplier sets the wholesale price and credit terms first, and the retailer reacts. The model incorporates:

  • Stochastic Market Demand: The retailer's sales are uncertain.
  • Capital Constraints: Both the supplier and retailer have limited initial capital.
  • Trade Credit: The supplier offers payment deferral to the retailer.
  • Trade Credit Insurance: The supplier can purchase insurance to cover a portion of potential non-payment. The model considers the insurance coverage rate ($\theta$) and premium rate ($s$).
  • Potential Financing Costs: An extension models a scenario where the supplier faces additional costs if their end-of-period cash flow falls below a certain threshold.

The analysis involves deriving equilibrium wholesale prices, quantities, and coverage rates by optimizing the expected profits of both the supplier and the retailer, considering these constraints and decisions.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The study relies on theoretical modeling and simulation with assumed demand distributions (specifically, a normal distribution $N(100,30)$ is used for illustrative examples).

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Counterintuitive Impact of Insurance: The most striking finding is that for capital-constrained suppliers, trade credit insurance can be detrimental to trade volume and retailer profits. This challenges the conventional wisdom that insurance always expands trade.
  • Capital Threshold is Key: The supplier's initial capital level is the critical determinant of whether insurance is beneficial. Sufficient capital leads to expansion; insufficient capital can lead to contraction.
  • Supplier's Strategic Dilemma: A capital-constrained supplier faces a trade-off: invest in production to increase sales volume, or invest in insurance to reduce risk. The optimal decision depends heavily on the specific parameters of the supply chain.
  • Insurance Company's Pricing Power: In an extended model, if the insurance company must maintain a positive expected return and cannot invest premiums, it might set a minimum premium. This can lead to suppliers never buying insurance, even if they face potential financing costs, if the threshold for these costs is outside a certain range.

Key Results

  • Sufficient Capital: When the supplier has enough capital, trade credit insurance always increases the trade quantity and is beneficial for trade expansion.
  • Insufficient Capital: When the supplier's initial capital is insufficient, trade credit insurance can reduce the trade quantity and the retailer's expected profit. For example, a simulation showed that with insufficient capital, insurance led to a lower order quantity and retailer profit compared to not using insurance.
  • Financing Costs: The introduction of potential financing costs for the supplier can lead to an increase in the wholesale price and a decrease in the trade quantity, potentially negating the trade-expanding effects of insurance in some scenarios.
  • Insurance Coverage: The optimal coverage rate is often binary: either 0% (no insurance) or 100% (full coverage), depending on the wholesale price and premium.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Model Simplifications: The paper assumes a single supplier and a single retailer, a fixed retail price, and specific demand distribution properties. Real-world supply chains are often more complex with multiple players and varying price dynamics.
  • Insurance Company Behavior: The extension assumes the insurance company has limited investment options. In reality, insurance companies actively invest premiums, which could alter pricing strategies and supplier decisions.
  • Future Research: The authors suggest extending the model to include competition among multiple retailers and suppliers, which would add significant complexity but provide a more realistic picture. Further investigation into the insurance company's investment strategies and their impact on premiums and supplier decisions is also warranted.

Summary updated

Abstract

This paper examines the role of trade credit insurance in a supply chain consisting of a capital-constrained supplier and a capital-constrained retailer. The retailer faces stochastic market demand and seeks trade credit from the supplier. The supplier, who is the Stackelberg game leader, decides the production quantity and the insurance coverage rate. We find that when the supplier’s initial capital is not sufficient, the use of trade credit insurance may reduce the trade quantity and the expected profit of the retailer. However, when the initial capital of the supplier is sufficient, the use of trade credit insurance will always increase the trade quantity. In the extension, we assume the supplier will face a potential financing cost if the net income is lower than the threshold. We find that if the insurance company has to keep its expected return positive and has no way to invest the insurance premium, the supplier will never buy the trade credit insurance no matter how much the marginal financing cost is when threshold is outside a certain range. Both the results and the methods in this paper can help businesses achieve a balance of funds and the logistics of the supply chain and risks, thereby improving the effectiveness of the supply chain operation.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{qin2022trade,
  author = {Jing Qin and Kun Qin and Yuxiang Cheng and Desheng Wu},
  title = {{Trade Credit Insurance for the Capital-Constrained Supplier}},
  booktitle = {Sustainability},
  year = {2022},
  doi = {10.3390/su142113812},
}
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