TL;DR
This paper investigates how the urban environment influences the likelihood of collusive bidding in construction projects, a practice that hinders sustainable development. Using data from 675 Chinese collusion cases, the study reveals that the urban environment primarily impacts collusive willingness indirectly, with the number of colluding companies acting as the key mediator.
What Problem Does This Paper Address?
Collusive bidding, where companies secretly agree on bid prices to manipulate competition, is a significant obstacle to sustainable urban development. While it's understood that the urban environment plays a role in fostering this illegal practice, the specific pathways through which this influence operates are not well-understood. This lack of clarity makes it difficult for urban planners and authorities to design effective countermeasures. This paper aims to bridge this gap by empirically analyzing how various aspects of the urban environment (socio-economic, industrial, and geographical) transmit their influence on bidders' willingness to collude.
Methods
The study employs a quantitative approach using path analysis to dissect the influence pathways. A key methodological tool is the bootstrap method, a resampling technique used to estimate the significance of direct and indirect effects. This method allows researchers to test hypotheses about mediation by calculating confidence intervals for the product of path coefficients. If a confidence interval for an indirect path does not contain zero, the mediation is considered statistically significant. The research also utilizes principal component analysis to reduce the dimensionality of highly correlated industrial competition variables, mitigating multicollinearity issues.
Datasets
The study utilizes a dataset comprising 675 collusive bidding cases in China's urban construction projects. This data was collected from the China Judgment Online website, which provides reliable judgment documents from people's courts. Additional data on socio-economic development and industrial competition environment were sourced from China Statistical Yearbooks. Geographical data, specifically the shortest distance between collusive projects and lead colluders, was obtained using China's Baidu Map.
Key Insights and Ideas
- Indirect Influence is King: The urban environment doesn't directly push bidders into collusion as much as it creates conditions that indirectly foster it. This is a crucial distinction for designing interventions.
- The "More, The Merrier" for Collusion: The number of companies willing to collude is the most significant factor mediating the urban environment's influence. More potential colluders mean a higher likelihood of successful collusion.
- Proximity Matters (Sometimes): When a collusive project and the leading colluder are in the same province, there's a slight indirect influence through project profitability. This suggests that localized networks can facilitate collusion.
- Socio-economic Nuances: While higher social development levels can increase collusive willingness (perhaps by creating more opportunities for illegal organizers), higher economic development levels tend to restrain it, likely due to increased business opportunities and potentially higher penalties.
Key Results
The study found that:
- Hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 were supported, indicating that the urban environment influences collusive willingness, and this influence is mediated by project profitability (H2) and the number of collusive companies (H3).
- Hypothesis H4 (dual mediation by project profitability and number of collusive companies) was not supported.
- The number of collusive companies (NCB) was identified as the most critical mediating variable across socio-economic and geographical factors. For instance, higher social development levels (WG) and geographical proximity (SP) positively influence collusive willingness through NCB.
- Conversely, higher economic development levels (PGDP) negatively impact collusive willingness, also mediated by NCB.
- Industrial competition environment (ICE) also influences collusive willingness primarily through NCB.
- Project profitability (WBP) played a minor mediating role, mainly for specific geographical characteristics like being in the same province (SP) or the central region (CR).
Limitations and Future Work
The authors acknowledge that the study's scope was limited by the availability of data and the factors considered. The urban environment is inherently complex and encompasses more variables than those analyzed. Future research is recommended to:
- Expand the dimensionality of urban environmental factors: Investigate a broader range of environmental aspects to capture a more comprehensive picture.
- Explore more complex situations: Apply the methodology to more diverse urban contexts and scenarios.
- Deepen the understanding of specific pathways: Further dissect the intricate mechanisms through which different urban environmental factors interact and influence collusive behavior.
Summary updated