Towards Generating Adversarial Examples on Mixed-type Data

Han Xu, Menghai Pan, Zhimeng Jiang, Huiyuan Chen, Xiaoting Li, Mahashweta Das, Hao YangarXiv 2022 · DOI · OpenReview

TL;DR

This paper introduces M-Attack, a novel algorithm for generating adversarial examples on mixed-type data (combining numerical and categorical features). M-Attack effectively perturbs both feature types simultaneously to mislead ML models, while a new "Mixed Mahalanobis Distance" helps these adversarial examples remain inconspicuous and evade detection.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Machine learning models are increasingly used in safety-critical applications like financial forecasting and fraud detection. However, these models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, where subtle, imperceptible changes to input data can cause misclassifications. A significant challenge arises when the data itself is "mixed-type," containing both numerical (e.g., age, income) and categorical (e.g., gender, occupation) features. Existing adversarial attack methods typically focus on either numerical or categorical data separately, leaving a gap in how to effectively attack models trained on mixed-type data. Furthermore, adversarial examples need to be "in-distribution" – close to the original data's distribution – to avoid detection by anomaly detection systems or human experts.

Methods

The core of the proposed solution is the M-Attack algorithm. It tackles mixed-type data by:

  • Unified Search Space: Transforming the problem into a unified continuous space by representing categorical features as probability distributions. This allows for simultaneous optimization of both numerical and categorical perturbations using gradient-based methods.
  • Simultaneous Perturbation: Unlike methods that sequentially attack numerical and categorical features, M-Attack updates both simultaneously, allowing it to better capture their interactions and find more effective adversarial examples.
  • Mixed Mahalanobis Distance: To ensure adversarial examples are "in-distribution" and evade detection, the authors introduce a novel Mixed Mahalanobis Distance. This metric measures the distance of an adversarial example to the distribution of clean data, considering the correlations between all mixed-type features. By regularizing this distance, M-Attack generates examples that are less likely to be flagged as outliers.

Datasets

The authors evaluated their method on three real-world datasets:

  • IEEE-CIS Transaction Dataset: Used for fraud detection, containing 108 numerical and 32 categorical features.
  • Home Credit Default Risk Dataset: Used for loan repayment prediction, with 73 numerical and 28 categorical features.
  • Criteo Display Advertising Dataset: Used for click-through rate prediction, featuring 13 numerical and 7 categorical features.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Interactions Matter: The interaction between numerical and categorical features is crucial. Simply attacking them separately (as baselines do) leads to suboptimal adversarial examples. M-Attack's simultaneous update strategy leverages these interactions.
  • In-Distribution is Key for Stealth: Adversarial examples that deviate too much from the original data distribution are easily detected. The Mixed Mahalanobis Distance is a clever way to enforce this "in-distribution" property, making attacks more insidious.
  • Unified Approach is More Optimal: The paper demonstrates that optimizing for both attack strength (loss maximization) and stealth (low Mixed Mahalanobis Distance) simultaneously, as M-Attack does, yields better results than sequential optimization.

Key Results

  • Effectiveness: M-Attack achieved higher successful attack rates compared to baseline methods (combinations of existing numerical and categorical attack techniques) on the CIS Fraud and Criteo datasets.
  • Efficiency: M-Attack's computational cost is not significantly affected by the perturbation budget, and it offers competitive efficiency.
  • Stealth: Experiments showed that imposing a small Mix Mahalanobis Distance significantly helps generated adversarial examples stay closer to the clean data distribution, making them harder to detect by OOD methods.
  • Optimality: When comparing trade-offs between attack loss and Mixed Mahalanobis Distance, M-Attack consistently achieved higher average loss values for similar levels of stealth compared to baselines.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Classifier Assumption: The current work assumes a white-box setting, where the attacker has full knowledge of the model's parameters and architecture.
  • Future Work: The authors suggest exploring other popular classifiers beyond the two-layer Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) used in their experiments, such as tree-based methods.

Summary updated

Abstract

The existence of adversarial attacks (or adversarial examples) brings huge concern about the machine learning (ML) model's safety issues. For many safety-critical ML tasks, such as financial forecasting, fraudulent detection, and anomaly detection, the data samples are usually mixed-type, which contain plenty of numerical and categorical features at the same time. However, how to generate adversarial examples with mixed-type data is still seldom studied. In this paper, we propose a novel attack algorithm M-Attack, which can effectively generate adversarial examples in mixed-type data. Based on M-Attack, attackers can attempt to mislead the targeted classification model's prediction, by only slightly perturbing both the numerical and categorical features in the given data samples. More importantly, by adding designed regularizations, our generated adversarial examples can evade potential detection models, which makes the attack indeed insidious. Through extensive empirical studies, we validate the effectiveness and efficiency of our attack method and evaluate the robustness of existing classification models against our proposed attack. The experimental results highlight the feasibility of generating adversarial examples toward machine learning models in real-world applications.
BibTeX
@misc{xu2022towards,
  author = {Han Xu and Menghai Pan and Zhimeng Jiang and Huiyuan Chen and Xiaoting Li and Mahashweta Das and Hao Yang},
  title = {{Towards Generating Adversarial Examples on Mixed-type Data}},
  year = {2022},
  eprint = {2210.09405},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.09405},
}
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