TMPTCP: A Lightweight Trust Extension for Multipath-TCP

Boyang Wu, Hewu Li, Qian Wu, Jiang Zhou, Jun LiuNaNA 2020 · OpenReview

Abstract

Multipath transmission control protocol (MPTCP) is vulnerable to many security attacks since source addresses are easily forged, which then greatly damages the availability, privacy and security of MPTCP. Though Source Address Validation (SAV) technologies effectively prevent these problems from network architecture, MPTCP cannot use the SAV information since the transport layer and the network layer is lack of the corresponding interfaces. In the meantime, recent studies use encryption or authentication to protect packets not to be forged, while this approach has high cost for some low-energy smart devices. In this paper, we propose a trusted MPTCP (TMPTCP) architecture that effectively combines the SAV technology and the conventional MPTCP. With the cross-layer trusted interface, TMPTCP could protect the packets by preferentially using the trusted sub-flow. Experiments show that TMPTCP can effectively reduce the transmission overhead of the smart devices compared to the MPTCP that needs complete authentication and encryption.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{wu2020tmptcp,
  author = {Boyang Wu and Hewu Li and Qian Wu and Jiang Zhou and Jun Liu},
  title = {{TMPTCP: A Lightweight Trust Extension for Multipath-TCP}},
  booktitle = {NaNA},
  year = {2020},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=NAgSta8yTx},
}

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