The Value of Feedback: An Analysis of the Reputation System
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Abstract
Markets prone to asymmetric information employ trust mechanisms to overcome ineciencies arising from adverse selection and/or moral hazard. We explore a change in such a trust mechanism and its eect on the marketplace. Starting 2008, sellers on eBay can no-longer leave non-positive feedbacks for sellers to prevent retaliation. We show that this policy had two important impacts: rst, the very worst sellers who used retaliation in the past exit the market disproportionately, resulting in an increase in sellers’ quality and reduction in adverse selection; second, the quality of transactions by surviving sellers increased, consistent with a reduction in moral hazard.
BibTeX
@misc{saeedi2015value,
author = {Maryam Saeedi and Zeqian Shen and Neel Sundaresan},
title = {{The Value of Feedback: An Analysis of the Reputation System}},
year = {2015},
howpublished = {SSRN},
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