TL;DR
This paper argues that the high debt-to-equity ratios of Korean firms, a key factor in the 1997 financial crisis, were not just a symptom of underdeveloped markets but a result of intentional financial repression designed to create and distribute "rents" between politicians and businesses. The study quantifies these rents and shows that firm size was a significant determinant of financial structure, though this influence waned after the crisis, suggesting a weakening of the political-business nexus.
What Problem Does This Paper Address?
The 2007 Asian financial crisis, particularly in Korea, highlighted the issue of high corporate indebtedness. While many attributed this to underdeveloped financial markets, this paper delves deeper, proposing a political economy explanation. The authors question whether this high indebtedness was a natural outcome or a consequence of a system where financial markets were deliberately suppressed. This suppression, they argue, created "rents" – essentially unearned profits – that were then shared between political elites and large business conglomerates. The paper aims to empirically investigate this hypothesis by quantifying the size of these rents and examining how firm size, a proxy for political influence, affected financial structures over time, especially in light of the 1997 crisis.
Methods
The paper employs a multi-pronged empirical approach. First, it estimates the size of rents generated through financial repression in Korean financial markets between 1971 and 1991. This is done by analyzing interest rate differentials between official bank loans and the curb market, and then multiplying this differential by the total outstanding loans. Second, it uses firm-level data from the Korea Stock Exchange for the period 1982-2001 to conduct an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis. This analysis examines the relationship between firm size (proxied by asset size) and the debt-to-equity ratio. The authors hypothesize that larger firms, with greater political connections, would have higher debt-to-equity ratios, but this effect would diminish as financial markets liberalized.
Datasets
The study utilizes two primary datasets:
- Interest Rate Data: Data on inflation, time deposits, bank loans (general and NIF, export), and curb market rates for the period 1964-1991, sourced from the Bank of Korea and cited in Joh (2001).
- Firm-Level Financial Data: Data on corporate securities proceeds (going public, right offerings, corporate bonds) for 1984-2001, sourced from the Bank of Korea and the Korea Stock Exchange. Additionally, firm-level data on debt/equity ratios and asset size for firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange from 1982-2001, obtained from the Korea Listed Companies Association.
Key Insights and Ideas
- Financial Repression as Rent Creation: The paper's central argument is that financial repression wasn't just a byproduct of underdevelopment but a deliberate mechanism to create and distribute economic rents. This challenges the view that the crisis was solely due to market failures.
- Quantifying the "Political Rent": The study provides concrete estimates of the economic rents generated by financial repression, showing they constituted a significant portion of Korea's GDP during the period. This offers a tangible measure of the economic benefits derived from this system.
- Firm Size as a Political Lever: The research highlights how firm size was a crucial determinant of financial structure, directly linked to political influence and access to cheaper credit. Larger firms could leverage their size to secure more favorable financing.
- The Impact of Liberalization: The paper demonstrates a clear trend: as financial markets liberalized and direct equity financing grew in the 1990s, the influence of firm size on debt-to-equity ratios decreased. This suggests that the mechanisms for rent-seeking and distribution were weakened.
- Weakening Political-Business Ties: The decline in the role of firm size as a determinant for financial structure is interpreted as evidence of a weakening connection between politicians and business, potentially a precursor to or consequence of the 1997 crisis.
Key Results
- Rent Estimates: The size of rents generated through financial repression in Korean financial markets during the 1970s and 1980s was substantial, ranging from approximately 3% to 8% of GDP. While these rents were significant, their relative size as a percentage of GDP showed a decreasing trend over time, particularly in the 1980s.
- Firm Size and Debt/Equity Ratio: The OLS regression analysis consistently showed a positive relationship between firm size (asset proxy) and the debt/equity ratio for the period 1982-2001. This indicates that larger firms tended to have higher debt-to-equity ratios.
- Declining Influence of Firm Size: The coefficients for firm size in the regression analysis (both positive and negative terms) showed a decreasing trend over the period. This statistically significant decline suggests that firm size became a less important determinant of financial structure, especially after the mid-1990s.
- R-squared Trend: The adjusted R-squared values in the regressions also showed a decreasing trend, further supporting the conclusion that firm size's explanatory power for debt/equity ratios diminished over time.
Limitations and Future Work
The authors acknowledge that the 1,000% debt/equity ratio cutoff is an arbitrary criterion, though justified by comparing Korean firms to international benchmarks. They also note that pooling data for the regression analysis might yield poorer results due to fluctuations reflecting business cycles and political turmoil.
Future work suggested includes further empirical testing to reveal more policy implications and combining the findings with research on the relationship between market concentration and financial structure. The paper positions itself as a "first step" in ongoing research into the political economy of Korean financial markets.
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