Abstract
A large literature has argued that offensive advantage makes states worse off because it can induce a security dilemma, preemption, costly conflict, and arms races. We argue instead that state welfare is u-shaped under offensive advantage. We assess the offense-defense balance by considering a model where two states choose arms levels and decide whether to attack. High defensive advantage is first-best because the arms burdens required to deter attacks and maintain peace are low. High offensive advantage is comparatively worse because war is likely, but war tends to be smaller in scale, quicker, and less costly. Intermediate offensive advantage is worst because high arms burdens are required to deter attacks while wars, when they occur, are larger, longer, and more destructive. We discuss historical examples of this phenomenon, including the Warring States periods in China and Japan, the Imjin War, the Federalist Papers, Napoleonic Europe, and the World Wars.
Introduction: Challenging the Security Dilemma
In international relations theory, the "offense-defense balance" is traditionally viewed through the lens of the security dilemma. The prevailing wisdom suggests that when military technology or geography favors the attacker, the international system becomes inherently more unstable and ruinous. In such environments, states are forced into expensive arms races out of fear, and the frequency of conflict increases, leading to a net loss in global welfare.
However, this paper argues that the traditional view is incomplete. By focusing primarily on the frequency of war, scholars have often overlooked the efficiency of war and the persistent burden of deterrence. We propose that state welfare is actually U-shaped relative to the offense-defense balance. While a strong defensive advantage is undoubtedly ideal, a strong offensive advantage can be superior to a "costly peace" because it facilitates shorter, more decisive conflicts and reduces the long-term resources wasted on military competition—the "costs of anarchy."
Theoretical Framework: Modeling Strategic Interaction
To explore this dynamic, we extend James Fearon’s "Costs of Anarchy" model (2018) using formal game theory. We analyze subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) across three iterations: a single-shot model with fixed costs, a repeated dynamic model with endogenous arming, and an operational model where war costs are determined by the time required to reach a decisive outcome.
The foundational strategic interaction is captured in a single-stage payoff matrix, where states must decide between attacking or maintaining peace based on their relative military strength and the structural advantages of offense versus defense.
By applying Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for constrained optimization, we solve for equilibrium arms levels. The model reveals that the marginal benefit of an additional unit of military power is highest when the balance is neutral. When one side possesses a structural advantage (either offensive or defensive), the utility of incremental spending diminishes, leading states to spend less on arms when offense is highly dominant.
The U-Shaped Welfare Curve
Our primary finding is the Welfare Under Offense (WUO) curve. Welfare is maximized under extreme defensive advantage because peace is "cheap" to maintain. However, welfare rises again under extreme offensive advantage. In this "offensive" regime, although wars may be more frequent, they are decisive and short-lived.
Crucially, decisive war can serve as a welfare-improving exit strategy from anarchy. If an offensive advantage allows for rapid conquest, the perpetual need for deterrence vanishes, and resources can be reallocated to consumption or investment. Conversely, welfare is at its nadir when the balance is neutral; here, arms races are most intense, and wars—when they occur—devolve into grinding, indecisive stalemates like the Western Front of World War I.
Historical Evidence and Case Studies
The model’s logic is supported by several qualitative historical transitions:
- Sengoku Jidai (Japan) and Warring States (China): These periods demonstrate how offensive innovations (professional armies, siege craft) eventually ended centuries of costly, indecisive anarchy through political consolidation.
- Napoleonic Warfare: The model contrasts the "offensive" success of Napoleon’s Central European campaigns with the "defensive" quagmire of the Russian campaign, illustrating how offensive advantage reduces the "total" nature of war costs.
- The World Wars: The transition from the defensive stalemate of WWI to the more mobile, offensive-oriented operations of WWII highlights how shifts in the balance change the scale and duration of conflict.
Conclusion and Limitations
While offensive advantage can improve welfare by ending anarchy, there are significant boundary conditions. If war becomes too destructive (e.g., the nuclear threshold), the "decisiveness" of offense is outweighed by catastrophic costs, making peace the only rational path. Furthermore, our model treats the offense-defense balance as exogenous, though states often innovate to shift this balance. Future research should consider the political costs of consolidation, such as the loss of sovereignty or the risks of autocratic rule, which may offset the material gains of ending the costs of anarchy.
Summary updated