Abstract
A large literature has argued that offensive advantage makes states worse off because it can induce a security dilemma, preemption, costly conflict, and arms races. We argue instead that state welfare is u-shaped under increasing offensive advantage. We assess the offense-defense balance by considering a model where two states choose arms levels and decide whether to attack. High defensive advantage is first-best because attacking is difficult and the arms burdens required to deter attacks and maintain peace are low. High offensive advantage is comparatively worse because war is likely, but war tends to be smaller in scale, quicker, and less costly. Intermediate offensive advantage is worst because high arms burdens are required to deter attacks while wars, when they occur, are larger, longer, and more destructive. We discuss historical examples of this phenomenon including from the Warring States periods in China and Japan, the Federalist papers, and the World Wars.
Introduction
In international relations (IR) theory, the "Security Dilemma" suggests that when technology or geography favors the attacker, states become more fearful, leading to arms races, preemption, and devastating conflicts. The prevailing wisdom is that a world favoring the defense is stable and "good," while a world favoring the offense is unstable and "bad."
This paper challenges this long-held international relations dogma. By modeling the "costs of anarchy," we demonstrate that state welfare is actually U-shaped: while a strong defensive advantage is ideal, extreme offensive advantage can be better than a balanced stalemate because it leads to shorter, less "total" wars and permanent political consolidation. The central question is whether a "costly peace" burdened by permanent high military spending is actually worse than a "decisive war" that ends the state of anarchy through unification.
Methodology and Formal Model
The analysis employs formal game-theoretic modeling to analyze the interaction between two states. The model extends James Fearon’s landmark frameworks of cooperation and conflict through three iterations: a single-shot model with exogenous arms, a dynamic model with endogenous arming, and an endogenous war costs model.
The foundation of this approach is a payoff matrix that captures the incentives for states to attack or maintain peace based on the offense-defense balance.
In this model, states choose how much of their resources (GNP) to spend on arms versus consumption. Welfare is measured as the resources left over for consumption. The authors use Contest Success Functions (CSFs) to determine the probability of victory and apply Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions to find the optimal arms levels for states in various scenarios, including Peace, Offensive War, and Security Dilemmas.
Key Insights: The U-Shaped Welfare Curve
The primary finding is that state welfare follows a U-shaped curve relative to offensive advantage.
- High Defensive Advantage: Welfare is highest here because peace is "cheap." Attacking is so difficult that states do not need to spend much on deterrence.
- Intermediate Offensive Advantage: This is the "valley" of the U-curve. Welfare is lowest because states must spend a fortune on arms to maintain a fragile peace. If war breaks out, it becomes a grueling, indecisive war of attrition.
- High Offensive Advantage: Welfare is second-highest. While war is more likely, it is also more decisive. High offensive advantage makes military operations "sprints" rather than "marathons," reducing the number of operations needed to end a war and making the conflict shorter and less costly in the long run.
Furthermore, arms spending is actually highest when the offense-defense balance is near neutrality. When the balance is equal, having a slightly larger army matters most, driving up costs. When offense is extreme, the "first-strike" advantage dominates, and states may actually spend less on total arming because the outcome is determined more by timing than by sheer mass.
Historical Evidence
The model's predictions are validated through several historical case studies:
- The Warring States periods in China and Japan: These periods demonstrate how improvements in siege technology (shifting the balance toward offense) eventually led to unification and long-term peace (the Edo and Qin periods).
- The Napoleonic Wars: The "offensive" campaigns in Central Europe were relatively quick and decisive compared to the "defensive" quagmire in Russia, which became a long, total, and highly destructive conflict.
- World Wars I and II: The shift from the trench warfare stalemate of 1915 to the more decisive tactics of 1918 (creeping barrages and tanks) illustrates how moving toward offensive decisiveness can end a ruinous stalemate.
Conclusion and Limitations
The "Welfare is U-shaped under Offense" (WUO) effect suggests that moving from a costly, armed stalemate to a world of high offensive decisiveness can cause an absolute increase in state welfare. However, this model has limits. If war is too costly—as in the case of a nuclear exchange—the model breaks down because peace is always the only rational equilibrium. Additionally, the model focuses on material welfare and does not account for the political or cultural costs of consolidation. Future research should explore how states intentionally try to manipulate the offense-defense balance through research and development.
Summary updated