The Nested States Model: An empirical approach to subjective experience

George H. Denfield, Evan J. KyzarPsyArXiv 2023 · DOI

TL;DR

The Nested States Model (NSM) offers a new hierarchical framework to quantify the "messiness" of subjective experience. By modeling the mind as a system of nested layers—where long-lasting background states like "hunger" or "mood" constrain fleeting foreground states like "thoughts"—the authors provide a computationally tractable bridge between clinical psychiatry and systems neuroscience.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Psychiatry currently faces a "subjectivity gap." On one hand, traditional clinical practice relies heavily on the rich, internal experiences of patients. On the other, modern empirical research (like the DSM or RDoC) often ignores these internal states in favor of "observable behaviors" or "neurobiological measures" because subjectivity is notoriously difficult to measure and model.

Existing attempts to bridge this gap, such as network models of symptoms, often treat mental states as flat, coarse-grained snapshots. They fail to capture the dynamic structure of the mind—how a deep-seated feeling of "fatalism" might persist for days and systematically bias the types of thoughts a person has from second to second. The authors argue that without a structured way to operationalize subjective experience, we cannot fully align clinical treatment with the findings of modern neuroscience.

Methods

The authors propose the Nested States Model (NSM), a structural and dynamic framework characterized by:

  • Hierarchical Layering: The model identifies six layers of states, organized from "background" to "foreground":
  • Lived body (e.g., physical sensations)
    1. Level of arousal (e.g., sleep-wake cycle)
    2. Motivational state (e.g., hunger, thirst)
    3. Existential feeling (e.g., a general sense of being "at home" or "threatened" in the world)
    4. Emotional state (e.g., anger, joy)
    5. Thoughts, images, and sensations.
  • Temporal Dynamics: Layers are distinguished by their "autocorrelation"—background states persist over longer timescales, while foreground states change rapidly.
  • Probabilistic Constraint: Background states act as "constraints" on foreground states. For example, a background state of "hunger" increases the transition probability toward an emotional state of "irritability," which in turn makes a "rude thought" more likely.
  • Formalization: The authors suggest that these Nested State Configurations (NSCs) can be formalized using Probabilistic Graphical Models (PGMs), such as Hierarchical Hidden Markov Models, and Dynamical Systems Theory, where states are viewed as "attractors" in a landscape.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. This is a theoretical and conceptual paper. However, the authors point toward Experience Sampling Methods (ESM)—where participants report their feelings in real-time via mobile devices—as the primary source of data for future empirical validation of the model.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • The "Hanger" Example: The paper uses the colloquial concept of being "hangry" to illustrate the model. Hunger (a background motivational state) constrains the affective layer, making "impatience" more likely than "tranquility," which then facilitates "anger" and eventually a "rude response."
  • Pathology as Rigidity: In the NSM view, mental illness isn't just about "having bad thoughts." It is defined by atypical dynamics:
  • Constriction: Occupying too narrow a range of background states (e.g., being stuck in a "fatalistic" existential feeling).
  • Rigidity: Transition probabilities that are too high (making it impossible to "snap out of it") or too low.
  • Instability: Transitions that occur too rapidly (as seen in bipolar mania).
  • Therapy as "State Engineering": The model re-conceptualizes existing treatments. Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) can be seen as modifying foreground transition probabilities (changing how thoughts influence mood), while medications or ECT might work by inducing "state changes" in the deeper, background layers of the hierarchy.

Key Results

As a theoretical framework, the "results" are qualitative demonstrations of the model's utility:

  • Differentiating Disorders: The authors show how the same symptom (e.g., catastrophizing thoughts) can arise from two different NSCs—one rooted in "hypervigilant anxiety" and another in "depressive fatalism"—requiring different therapeutic approaches.
  • Neuroscience Alignment: The authors demonstrate that the NSM’s hierarchical structure mirrors recent findings in systems neuroscience, where neuronal activity in organisms like zebrafish and C. elegans has been shown to organize into nested hierarchies with characteristic timescales.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Preliminary Taxonomy: The six-layer hierarchy is a starting point and will likely need refinement as more phenomenological data is collected.
  • Computational Implementation: While the authors suggest using PGMs and Dynamical Systems Theory, they have not yet published a full-scale computational implementation of the NSM.
  • Data Requirements: Building accurate individual models will require high-density longitudinal data (experience sampling), which can be burdensome for patients.
  • Mapping to Brain Activity: The ultimate goal is to map specific "Nested State Configurations" to specific patterns of neuronal population dynamics, a task that remains a significant future challenge for the field.

Summary updated

Abstract

Subjective experience is central to the nature of mental illness, yet it has not played a central role in most empirical approaches to psychopathology. Despite some recent progress, we lack detailed phenomenological models for psychopathological processes and mental disorders. Here, we present a framework through which such models could be constructed. This framework is derived from the Nested States Model (NSM), which describes the dynamic structure of subjective experience as a system of nested states. Through this characterization, it provides a flexible and structured scheme for operationalizing subjective experience, which facilitates the empirical study of subjectivity. More broadly, we argue that the NSM forms a basis for thinking about psychopathological processes centered around the notion of states and their transitions. From this perspective, an approach could be developed that is near to individual experience, empirically tractable, and aligned with on-going research in neuroscience.
BibTeX
@misc{denfield2023nested,
  author = {George H. Denfield and Evan J. Kyzar},
  title = {{The Nested States Model: An empirical approach to subjective experience}},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.31234/osf.io/zqa95},
  howpublished = {PsyArXiv},
}

Loading related content...

Figure