Abstract This paper examines the economic growth prospects of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). To increase potential growth, it suggests reforms in four areas—labor, education and training, capital, and productivity. Economic growth in the PRC has moderated over the past decade, a trend exacerbated by the pandemic. This paper estimates the level of economic growth to which the country should be able to return after the pandemic. More broadly, it looks at the PRC’s long-term growth prospects given its rapidly aging society, a high dependence of growth on investment, and a changed international environment.
Introduction
For several decades, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) maintained an exceptional trajectory of double-digit growth. However, this trend began to moderate significantly well before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. As the global economy enters a post-pandemic era, economists and policymakers are focused on determining the PRC’s "potential growth"—the maximum output an economy can sustain without stoking inflation—over the next two decades.
The challenge is multifaceted. The PRC faces the prospect of "growing old before becoming rich," characterized by a shrinking working-age population and diminishing returns on massive infrastructure and real estate investments. Furthermore, a shifting international environment and rising domestic debt—which doubled as a percentage of GDP between 2008 and 2021—suggest that the traditional investment-led model is reaching its limits. This paper provides a rigorous forecast of the PRC’s potential GDP growth through 2040, predicting a structural slowdown from approximately 5% today to 2% by the late 2030s.
Methodology
To quantify these headwinds, the study employs an Extended Solow Model utilizing a Cobb-Douglas production function. This standard macroeconomic framework allows for the decomposition of GDP growth into four primary input factors:
- Labor (L): Measured as the growth of the working-age population (ages 15–59).
- Human Capital (h): Calculated based on average years of schooling and the estimated economic returns on education.
- Physical Capital (K): Estimated using the "perpetual inventory method," accounting for new investment minus depreciation.
- Total Factor Productivity (TFP or A): The "efficiency" factor, further decomposed into drivers such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), import growth, R&D expenditure, and the "sectoral labor shift" (the productivity gain from moving workers from low-productivity agriculture to higher-productivity industry and services).
The analysis is distinguished by its use of updated 2020 census data and a "catch-up" benchmarking approach, comparing the PRC’s development path to the historical trajectories of Japan and the Republic of Korea.
Data Sources
The study synthesizes several high-quality datasets to ensure robust projections:
- Demographics: UN World Population Prospects (2019) and the PRC’s 2020 National Census.
- Education: The Barro-Lee (2021) dataset on educational attainment.
- Capital & Investment: IMF Investment and Capital Stock Dataset (2021) and National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data.
- Productivity Drivers: OECD FDI restrictiveness indices and R&D expenditure data from the World Bank.
Drivers of Economic Moderation
Several structural factors are contributing to the projected slowdown:
The Demographic Drag: The PRC's working-age population peaked in 2011. Utilizing a "low fertility variant" for the forecast, the study notes that even recent policy shifts, such as the "Three-Child Policy," have yet to reverse this decline. Consequently, labor will remain a persistent negative contributor to growth.
Diminishing Returns on Capital: The Incremental Capital Output Ratio (ICOR)—a measure of the investment required to produce one unit of growth—has nearly doubled since 2000. This indicates that it now requires twice as much capital to generate the same level of growth as it did two decades ago.
The End of Reallocation Gains: Historically, much of the PRC's TFP growth was derived from the "Lewis Turning Point" gains—moving workers from agriculture to more productive sectors. As the agricultural share of employment is projected to drop toward 11% by 2040, these gains will naturally fade.
The R&D Paradox: While R&D spending as a percentage of GDP is approaching high-income levels, the efficiency of this spending is hampered by a lack of focus on basic research compared to applied commercial technology, alongside issues regarding the misappropriation of funds.
Growth Projections
The paper’s central forecast indicates a steady, step-down decline in potential GDP growth over the coming decades:
- 2020–2025: 5.3%
- 2026–2030: 3.5%
- 2031–2035: 2.7%
- 2036–2040: 2.0%
To mitigate a sharper decline, the authors emphasize the need to address the State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) imbalance. SOEs currently receive a disproportionate share of credit (83% of total credit to non-financial enterprises in 2016) despite generally yielding lower returns on assets than private firms.
Conclusion and Limitations
While the era of "easy" growth driven by a massive labor force and heavy investment is over, targeted reforms in capital allocation, rural education, and R&D efficiency remain critical to maintaining a sustainable trajectory. However, several uncertainties remain:
- TFP Volatility: As a "residual" factor, TFP is notoriously difficult to forecast and sensitive to technological or political shifts.
- Geopolitical Decoupling: Aggressive "technological decoupling" could lower potential growth even further than the 2% estimate.
- COVID-19 Scarring: Long-term effects on human capital or labor participation due to the pandemic are not fully captured in the current model.
Future research should explore the impact of the digital economy on service sector productivity, which may provide an upside to these conservative estimates.
Summary updated