The Impact of Epidemic on the Trans-Pacific Container Liner Shipping Market: A Game of the Supply and Demand

Yang Qing-fu, En Yang, Feng LuoAsian 2022 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper applies game theory to explain the "skyrocketing" freight rates on Trans-Pacific shipping routes during the COVID-19 pandemic. By modeling the interaction between shipowners and cargo owners as a Bayesian refined Nash equilibrium, the authors demonstrate that as long as the probability of the epidemic persisting remains above 49%, shipping rates are likely to stay elevated despite efforts to increase vessel capacity.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

The COVID-19 pandemic triggered a "perfect storm" in global logistics. Between June and December 2020 alone, the Shanghai export container freight index surged by 274%. Shippers faced a chaotic market defined by "cabin explosions" (overbooked ships), "space shortages," and massive surcharges.

The authors seek to understand the underlying mechanics of this volatility. Specifically, they address how supply and demand sides make decisions when the future of the epidemic—and thus the future of the market—is uncertain. The challenge is that neither the shipping lines (supply) nor the cargo owners (demand) have perfect information about the "type" of market they are currently in (e.g., whether the epidemic trend is rising or falling).

Methods

The researchers employ a Bayesian refined Nash equilibrium model, a subset of game theory used for "games of incomplete information."

Key components of their approach include:

  • The Harsanyi Transformation: To handle uncertainty, the authors introduce a "Natural" participant. This theoretical player "chooses" the state of the world (Epidemic Rising vs. Epidemic Not Rising) based on a probability ($P$).
  • Participants & Strategies:
    • Supply Side (Liner Companies): Can choose to "Increase Capacity Investment" (CI) or "No Increase" (CN).
  • Demand Side (Shippers): Can choose to "Expand Demand" (DE) or "Non-Expanding" (DN).
  • The Payoff Matrix: The authors calculated "payoffs" (benefits/losses) for each combination of strategies using real-world growth rates in trade volume and freight indices.
  • Dynamic Modeling: Unlike a static game, this model assumes players observe certain signals (like current freight rate trends) before finalizing their strategies.

Datasets

The study calibrates its game-theoretic model using two primary data sources from 2018 to 2020:

  1. Shanghai Export Container Comprehensive Freight Index (SCFI): Specifically, the growth rates for the US West Coast and East Coast routes.
  2. China-US Import and Export Trade Volume Growth Rates: Sourced from the China Shipping Database and the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC.

These datasets provided the empirical "payoff" values used to determine which strategies were most profitable for participants under different epidemic scenarios.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • The 49% Threshold: The model reveals a critical tipping point. If the perceived probability ($P$) that the epidemic trend will continue is greater than 0.49, the demand side will choose to expand trade (DE). This creates a feedback loop where high demand justifies high rates.
  • Dominant Strategy for Suppliers: For shipping lines, "increasing capacity investment" (CI) emerges as a dominant strategy when demand is expanding. Even if they add more ships, the payoff for doing so (9.9 in their matrix) is higher than not adding them (0.3), because the market remains "short" relative to the massive demand for anti-epidemic materials and daily necessities.
  • Supply-Controlled Market: The paper suggests that the Trans-Pacific route shifted into a "supply-controlled" state. In this regime, even when capacity is added, it is absorbed so quickly by the "expanding demand" strategy of shippers that the downward pressure on prices is neutralized.

Key Results

The study concludes that the equilibrium state for the Trans-Pacific market during the epidemic is ({DE, CI}, P > 0.49).

Quantitatively, the authors highlight that the shift from a $1,000/TEU (Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit) baseline in 2019 to nearly triple that by late 2020 was a rational outcome of this game. The Bayesian refinement shows that as long as shippers believe there is a roughly 50/50 chance (or better) of the epidemic continuing to disrupt the status quo, they will continue to pay premium surcharges to ensure their goods arrive, which in turn keeps the freight rates on an upward trajectory.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Data Recency: The paper relies heavily on data from 2020 and early 2021. The "bullwhip effect" and the subsequent cooling of the global economy in 2023-2024 are not captured.
  • Simplification of "Capacity": The model treats "capacity investment" largely as adding ships. In reality, port congestion and land-side logistics (trucking, warehousing) acted as significant bottlenecks that "capacity" on the water could not solve.
  • Geopolitical Factors: The model focuses on the epidemic as the sole "Natural" driver. Future work could incorporate geopolitical tensions or fuel price volatility (IMO 2020 regulations) as additional variables in the Bayesian game.

Summary updated

Abstract

Since January 2020, the global novel coronavirus epidemic (referred to as the epidemic) has raged. Countries around the world have "suspended" most economic activities in order to prevent the spread of the epidemic. As a result, the global supply chain is severely disrupted, causing global inflation to rise. Freight rates on the trans-Pacific route from North America to the Asia-Pacific region continued to skyrocket, surcharge items increased, and delivery events were extended. Based on the analysis of the current situation of the impact on the trans-Pacific supply chain, the paper uses the data of the growth rate of Sino-US trade volume as a "pay off" sample to establish a supply-demand game model for container liners on the trans-Pacific route under the background of the epidemic. Under the dynamic assumption of incomplete information, a Bayesian refined Nash equilibrium is obtained. Finally, the paper uses the Bayesian refined Nash equilibrium model to analyze the trend of container liner shipping rates on trans-Pacific routes under the background of the epidemic.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{qingfu2022impact,
  author = {Yang Qing-fu and En Yang and Feng Luo},
  title = {{The Impact of Epidemic on the Trans-Pacific Container Liner Shipping Market: A Game of the Supply and Demand}},
  booktitle = {Asian},
  year = {2022},
  doi = {10.5539/ass.v18n6p1},
}
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