The Governance Structure of Transactions in Enterprise Clusters : the Case of Bicycle Industry in Rural China

Siquan Xie, Jiuli Huang, Desheng Wu, Satoshi Kai, Zhigang WangJournal of the Faculty of Agriculture Kyushu University 2004 · DOI

Abstract

Based on a field investigation of the bicycle enterprise cluster in Wang Qingtuo, this paper identifies the institutional bases for transactions and contracting as "linkage games." These bilateral linkage games facilitate transactions among enterprises in the cluster through relational contracts. The bundling of different economic domains and the intervention of third parties further improve the governance structure of the enterprise cluster. We argue that while the cluster's early rapid development relied on the embeddedness of economic and social exchange domains, the deficiencies of traditional village norms in a market economy necessitate the introduction of third-party governance for continued advancement.

Introduction: The Wang Qingtuo Phenomenon

Traditional economic theory suggests that industrial clusters typically form near raw materials, major markets, or transport hubs. However, the town of Wang Qingtuo, near Tianjin, defied these rules. Starting with a single workshop in 1994, it transformed into a global bicycle manufacturing hub, producing 10% of China’s total bicycle output by 2001 despite having no prior industrial foundation. By the early 2000s, the cluster had grown to 95 assembly firms and 145 part firms, reaching an annual output of 420 million units and $100 million in sales.

This paper addresses a central puzzle: How do thousands of small, family-run firms coordinate complex supply chains and maintain stable business relationships in an environment where formal legal protections are weak? In such settings, "opportunistic behavior" (cheating) should theoretically prevent the formation of complex industrial networks.

Methodology

The researchers conducted a qualitative field investigation of the Wang Qingtuo bicycle cluster, analyzing findings through the lens of New Institutional Economics. Key frameworks applied include:

  • Game Theory: Using concepts like the "Prisoner’s Dilemma" and "Linkage Games" to explain cooperative choices.
  • Contract Theory: Distinguishing between "classical" (legalistic) and "relational" (trust-based) contracts.
  • Social Embeddedness: Examining how economic transactions are integrated into social networks such as kinship and neighborhood ties.

Key Insights: Governance through Linkage Games

The core of the cluster's success lies in the "Linkage Game." In a standard business deal, a firm might be tempted to cheat for a one-time gain. In Wang Qingtuo, however, economic deals are "bundled" with social life. Because suppliers and buyers are often neighbors or relatives, cheating a business partner results in a loss of social standing and "social capital." This multi-domain linkage makes the cost of cheating prohibitively high, effectively self-enforcing contracts.

Social Capital as a "Mortgage"

Unlike large corporations that invest in specific, expensive machinery (sunk costs) to signal commitment, these small firms "mortgage" their reputation. This reliance on social capital allows for high flexibility; firms can pivot production quickly because they are not constrained by rigid, formal assets.

Relational Contracts

Transactions are handled through informal, long-term agreements known as relational contracts. These allow for "enforcing flexibility." For example, if a firm is late on a delivery due to an unforeseen accident, the community norms allow for forgiveness and adjustment rather than immediate litigation, which would be the standard under classical contracting.

Results and The Role of Third-Party Governance

The study demonstrates that Town and Village Enterprises (TVEs) can achieve massive scale by leveraging informal institutions. By 2001, 80% of Wang Qingtuo’s residents had shifted from agriculture to the bicycle industry. The "Wang Qingtuo Phenomenon" proved that institutional adaptability—using social ties to replace missing formal legal systems—is a viable path for rural industrialization.

However, the authors identify a "ceiling" for this model. Traditional "pre-market" ethics have limits when scaling to anonymous national or global markets. Some firms within the cluster struggled with "low-technology level repetitive construction" and cutthroat price competition. Furthermore, the social "linkage game" does not extend to outside buyers, leading to issues with brand imitation or inferior goods that could damage the cluster's collective reputation.

Conclusion and Future Outlook

To overcome these limitations, the cluster must transition from purely informal governance to a hybrid model. This includes the intervention of "third parties," such as industry associations (e.g., the Tianjin Bicycle Industry Association), to set technical standards, safeguard rights, and enforce quality standards. While social embeddedness fueled the cluster's birth, formal institutional frameworks are required to ensure its survival in a competitive global market.

Summary updated

Abstract

Based on the field investigation of bicycle enterprise cluster in Wang Qingtuo, this paper points out that the institutional bases for transactions and contracting are linkage games. And it is the bilateral linkage games that make transactions among enterprises in the cluster in the form of relational contracts. Meanwhile, the bundling of different economic domains and the intervention of the third party further improve the governance structure of enterprise cluster. In this paper, we argue that the cluster's early rapid development did rely on the embeddedness of economic domains and social exchange domains. However, because of the fact that traditional village norms still have some deficiencies of the pre-market economy, TVE clusters may advance through the introduction of the third parties.
BibTeX
@article{xie2004governance,
  author = {Siquan Xie and Jiuli Huang and Desheng Wu and Satoshi Kai and Zhigang Wang},
  title = {{The Governance Structure of Transactions in Enterprise Clusters : the Case of Bicycle Industry in Rural China}},
  journal = {Journal of the Faculty of Agriculture Kyushu University},
  year = {2004},
  doi = {10.5109/4577},
}
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