The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Structural Reform of the American Workplace

Margo Schlanger, Pauline T. KimSSRN 2013 · DOI

Introduction

In the landscape of American employment law, the 2011 Supreme Court decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes serves as a watershed moment. By significantly raising the bar for private class-action certification, the ruling effectively curtailed the ability of private plaintiffs to challenge systemic discrimination on a massive scale. This shift placed a renewed spotlight on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Unlike private litigants, the EEOC possesses unique statutory authority to bring "pattern or practice" suits without meeting the rigorous Rule 23 class certification requirements that stymied the Wal-Mart plaintiffs.

Legal scholars have long debated the impact of such systemic litigation. Does the EEOC act as a "gladiator" for social justice, or a "collaborator" in workplace innovation? This study provides an empirical reality check, analyzing a decade of EEOC data to reveal a phenomenon the authors term Enforced Managerialism.

Theoretical Frameworks of Litigation

The study tests three competing theories regarding the nature and impact of systemic employment litigation:

  1. The Gladiator Model: This view posits that systemic suits are high-stakes, adversarial battles. Through aggressive litigation, the EEOC forces recalcitrant institutions to undergo fundamental structural changes.
  2. The Collaboration (Experimentalist) Model: This theory suggests a more flexible, stakeholder-driven approach. Here, the court, the EEOC, and the employer work together to solve complex problems through iterative, tailored solutions.
  3. The Managerialism Model: This perspective argues that litigation results in the adoption of standardized, HR-approved "best practices." These remedies—such as diversity training or formal grievance procedures—signal legal compliance but often fail to alter underlying power dynamics or organizational culture.

Methodology

The researchers conducted a multi-method study centered on the EEOC Litigation Project database, covering fiscal years 1997 to 2006. The study focused on "systemic" cases, identified using criteria such as "pattern or practice" allegations, involvement of 20 or more victims, or claims exceeding $1 million in damages.

The quantitative analysis involved a stratified random sample of 2,316 cases, from which 281 systemic cases were isolated. To understand the substantive impact of these cases, the authors systematically coded the injunctive relief (non-monetary requirements) in 215 resolved consent decrees. This was supplemented by qualitative case studies of three representative litigations (EEOC v. Dial Corp., EEOC v. McKesson Water Products, and EEOC v. PJAX), involving interviews with counsel and extensive document review.

The Reality of Systemic Litigation

The empirical findings challenge both the "Gladiator" and "Collaboration" narratives, suggesting a more routinized reality.

The Myth of the Gladiator

Contrary to the image of "bet-the-company" warfare, most EEOC systemic cases are relatively low-intensity. The study found that 87.4% of systemic cases ended in settlement, while only 5% resulted in a litigated judgment for the EEOC. Furthermore, 70% of settled cases involved no substantive motions (such as motions for summary judgment) prior to resolution. The scale of these cases was also more modest than often assumed: the median number of persons compensated was only 7, and the median monetary award was $425,000.

Boilerplate Reform and Enforced Managerialism

Rather than the tailored, "experimentalist" solutions predicted by collaboration theory, the researchers found "cookie-cutter" decrees. Most settlements lasted only two to three years (71.6%), and relied on a standard toolkit of HR bureaucracy. The most common remedies were peripheral to core business operations:

  • 87% of decrees required EEO training.
  • 86% required the posting of notices regarding employee rights.
  • 32% required the implementation of formal complaint or dispute resolution processes.

The EEOC’s primary role, therefore, appears to be the ratification and dissemination of standard HR practices. By compelling laggard companies to adopt formal policies, the EEOC acts as a "backstop" that forces them to meet the baseline of modern corporate management. This "Enforced Managerialism" ensures a minimum standard of bureaucratic compliance but rarely involves deep structural reorganization.

The Absence of Stakeholders

A key tenet of collaborative reform is the involvement of affected stakeholders. However, the study found that unions and employee groups were almost never given a role in monitoring or implementing the settlements. The reform process remains a top-down negotiation between government lawyers and corporate HR departments, leaving the actual workers on the periphery of the "structural" change.

Conclusion and Implications

The study suggests that the EEOC’s systemic litigation program serves more as a regulatory mechanism for spreading standardized management practices than as a vehicle for radical workplace transformation. While this "Enforced Managerialism" may professionalize the workplace and curb the most egregious laggards, its long-term efficacy in reducing bias remains unproven.

As the legal landscape continues to evolve, the reliance on "boilerplate" remedies raises critical questions. Without empirical evidence that diversity training and formal grievance procedures actually dismantle structural inequality, the EEOC risks engaging in a cycle of routinized litigation that prioritizes bureaucratic signaling over substantive equality. Future research must look beyond the written word of consent decrees to determine if these managerial fixes translate into meaningful change on the factory floor.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@misc{schlanger2013equal,
  author = {Margo Schlanger and Pauline T. Kim},
  title = {{The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Structural Reform of the American Workplace}},
  year = {2013},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.2309514},
  howpublished = {SSRN},
}
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