The Computational Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Concisely Represented Games

Grant Schoenebeck, Salil P. VadhanACM Trans. Comput. Theory 2012 · OpenReview

Abstract

Games may be represented in many different ways, and different representations of games affect the complexity of problems associated with games, such as finding a Nash equilibrium. The traditional method of representing a game is to explicitly list all the payoffs, but this incurs an exponential blowup as the number of agents grows. We study two models of concisely represented games: circuit games, where the payoffs are computed by a given boolean circuit, and graph games, where each agent’s payoff is a function of only the strategies played by its neighbors in a given graph. For these two models, we study the complexity of four questions: determining if a given strategy is a Nash equilibrium, finding a Nash equilibrium, determining if there exists a pure Nash equilibrium, and determining if there exists a Nash equilibrium in which the payoffs to a player meet some given guarantees. In many cases, we obtain tight results, showing that the problems are complete for various complexity classes.
BibTeX
@article{schoenebeck2012computational,
  author = {Grant Schoenebeck and Salil P. Vadhan},
  title = {{The Computational Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Concisely Represented Games}},
  journal = {ACM Trans. Comput. Theory},
  year = {2012},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=K-DIBfQo2Uv},
}

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