The Coevolution of Behavior and Normative Expectations: An Experiment

Christoph Engel, Michael KurschilgenAmerican 2013 · DOI

Abstract

In this paper, we test the effect of normative expectations and legal framing on cooperation in an experimental public good game with and without sanctions. We show that cooperation increases substantially as normative expectations and behavioral patterns coevolve. In the absence of sanctions, legal framing does not have any additional beneficial effect in realigning individual action and social well-being. Yet, in the presence of sanctions, the legal frame is crucial for the effectiveness of sanctions. Law and sanctions seem to complement each other. Our results inform the legal debate on customary law. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{engel2013coevolution,
  author = {Christoph Engel and Michael Kurschilgen},
  title = {{The Coevolution of Behavior and Normative Expectations: An Experiment}},
  booktitle = {American},
  year = {2013},
  doi = {10.1093/aler/aht010},
}

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