Abstract
Cultural hegemony is identified by the ideology of the ruling class, serving as a theoretical model to obtain political leadership through both "mobile warfare" and "trench warfare." During the Chinese Liberation War, the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) adjusted its strategy to unite with all possible allies, securing the cultural and ideological identity of the people. By strengthening internal party construction and guiding practice through theoretical study, the CPC increased its rallying power and combat capacity. This combination of violent revolution and ideological identity formed the foundation of their successful seizure of cultural hegemony, providing valuable historical experience in political leadership.
Introduction
The victory of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in the Liberation War (1945–1949) is often viewed through the lens of military maneuvers and battlefield successes. However, a purely military analysis overlooks the fundamental ideological struggle that preceded and accompanied the armed conflict. This paper argues that the CPC’s triumph was rooted in the successful acquisition of "cultural hegemony"—a concept famously articulated by Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci. By securing the voluntary consent and ideological identity of the Chinese masses, the CPC transformed itself from a revolutionary insurgent group into a legitimate ruling power.
The Problem of Hegemony: Overcoming Material Disadvantage
At the outbreak of the Liberation War, the Kuomintang (KMT) held significant material advantages: a force of 4.2 million troops, control over major urban centers, and substantial financial and military support from the United States. Conventional military logic might have predicted a KMT victory. The CPC addressed this disparity by focusing on the "right of speech" and building a shared identity among peasants, intellectuals, and the middle class. While the KMT relied heavily on coercive power, the CPC prioritized winning the hearts and minds of the populace, bridging the material gap through superior social mobilization.
Theoretical Framework: Mobile vs. Trench Warfare
The authors employ a qualitative historical analysis, applying Gramscian political theories to the 1940s Chinese context. Two key concepts are central to this analysis:
- Mobile Warfare vs. Trench Warfare: In this framework, "mobile warfare" refers to direct military confrontation, while "trench warfare" represents the slow, ideological infiltration of civil society. The CPC recognized that military victory alone was insufficient; they needed to occupy the "ideological trenches" of society to ensure long-term stability and legitimacy.
- Organic Intellectuals: The CPC developed a cadre of "organic intellectuals"—individuals who were both theoretically grounded and practically experienced. These cadres acted as bridges between elite party ideology and the daily realities of the masses, translating complex political goals into relatable social objectives.
Key Strategies for Seizing Hegemony
Identity through Land Reform
Land reform was not merely an economic policy; it served as a powerful "belief-firming" mechanism. By solving the basic survival issues of the peasantry, the CPC transformed abstract Marxist-Leninist ideology into a tangible "personal experience." This secured the peasants' voluntary loyalty, as they saw their own material interests directly tied to the CPC's political success.
The "Second Front" and United Front Strategy
In areas ruled by the KMT, the CPC utilized patriotic democratic movements to create an ideological "trench." By avoiding head-on military confrontation in the cities and focusing on economic grievances and patriotic sentiment, they won over "centrists" and intellectuals. This "United Front" strategy effectively isolated the KMT and broadened the CPC's base of voluntary consent.
Internal Ideological Construction
The CPC maintained its status as a "vanguard" through rigorous internal discipline, exemplified by the "Three-check Movement." This ensured that the party remained a cohesive, "organic" unit. By aligning internal practice with external propaganda, the CPC projected an image of integrity and purpose that contrasted sharply with the perceived corruption of the KMT.
Soft Power as a Force Multiplier
The paper highlights the strategic use of art and literature to "liberate" the thoughts of women and youth. Through "Red songs," novels like Ding Ling’s The Sun Shines on the Sanggan River, and revolutionary plays, the CPC created a "Strong Cultural Front." These tools were essential for educating and mobilizing a largely illiterate peasantry, making the KMT’s traditional military power increasingly irrelevant in the eyes of the public.
Conclusion: The Synthesis of Power
The CPC’s success was the result of a sophisticated "Soft and Hard" combination. Military success in annihilating KMT forces was paired with a gradual occupation of the ideological front. By the time the KMT was militarily defeated, it had already lost its social and moral legitimacy. The CPC successfully transitioned from a "secondary class" to the "ruling class" by gaining the active consent of the majority, demonstrating that true political leadership rests on the foundation of cultural hegemony.
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