TL;DR
This paper introduces "temporal information design" for contests, where organizers can strategically reveal contestant information over time to boost profits. They show that by carefully controlling the timing and scope of information disclosure, organizers can significantly outperform standard "all-or-nothing" or "fully sequential" contest designs, especially in scenarios with uncertainty.
What Problem Does This Paper Address?
Contests are widely used to incentivize effort, ideas, or participation. While much research focuses on designing the prize structure, this paper highlights a less explored but crucial aspect: information design. Specifically, it addresses how organizers can strategically reveal information about contestants' actions during the contest, rather than all at once before it begins. This temporal aspect transforms contests from static games into dynamic ones, where contestants can react to unfolding events. The core problem is to understand how this dynamic information disclosure impacts contestant behavior and, crucially, the organizer's profit, and to characterize optimal disclosure strategies.
Methods
The authors employ a game-theoretic approach to model contests with temporal information design. They introduce the concept of an "information disclosure scheme" as a commitment by the organizer to reveal information about subsets of contestants at specific times. This leads to a temporal activity structure, potentially involving epochs where groups of contestants act in parallel.
They analyze two common contest models:
- Binary Contest: Contestants decide whether to participate or not, incurring a cost. Their performance is a random variable. The organizer aims to maximize expected performance minus prize cost.
- Tullock Contest: Contestants choose effort levels, with costs that can be heterogeneous and uncertain. The probability of winning is proportional to their effort relative to others. The organizer aims to maximize total effort minus prize cost.
For both models, they derive equilibrium strategies for contestants, considering the organizer's disclosure scheme. They analyze scenarios ranging from fully parallel (no information revealed) to fully sequential (information revealed one by one) and intermediate "hybrid" schemes.
Datasets
Not discussed in the paper.
Key Insights and Ideas
- Temporal Information Design is Powerful: The core insight is that strategically revealing information over time can significantly increase an organizer's profit, often more than traditional contest designs.
- No One-Size-Fits-All: The optimal information disclosure scheme is highly dependent on the contest's parameters (e.g., participation costs, prize value, agent types). What works best in one scenario might be suboptimal in another.
- Uncertainty is Key: The benefits of temporal information design are most pronounced when there's uncertainty about contestants' capabilities or costs. If everything were known upfront, the contest itself might be unnecessary.
- Hybrid Schemes Can Be Optimal: Intermediate disclosure schemes, where information is revealed in batches or to specific groups, can outperform both fully parallel and fully sequential designs.
- Avoiding Deadlocks: The paper formalizes how information disclosure can lead to "deadlocks" where contestants wait indefinitely for others, and how to structure schemes to avoid this.
Key Results
- Profit Maximization: The paper demonstrates through examples (Figures 1 and 2) that carefully chosen temporal information disclosure schemes can lead to significantly higher organizer profits compared to standard parallel or sequential contests. For instance, in one example, a hybrid scheme yielded a profit of 4.114, while a fully sequential one yielded 0.135.
- Equilibrium Characterization: The paper provides a game-theoretic characterization of subgame perfect equilibrium strategies for contestants under various temporal information disclosure schemes for both binary and Tullock contests.
- Monotonicity of Participation: For the binary contest, they show that equilibrium participation probabilities are non-increasing with respect to the observed performance from previous epochs, meaning contestants are less likely to participate if past performance was high.
Limitations and Future Work
- Computational Complexity: Determining the optimal disclosure scheme is computationally challenging due to the exponential number of possible schemes.
- Broadcast Assumption: The current model assumes a "broadcast" setting where information is revealed to all or none. Future work could explore selective information disclosure to specific contestants.
- Commitment Power: The paper assumes the organizer has commitment power. Investigating scenarios where this power is limited is a potential future direction.
- Dominance Relations: Establishing dominance relations between different disclosure schemes under various conditions would be valuable.
- More Complex Models: Extending the analysis to more complex contest structures and agent behaviors is also suggested.
Summary updated