Task Allocation in Customer-led Two-sided Markets with Satellite Constellation Services

Jianglin Qiao, Zehong Cao, Dave de Jonge, Ryszard KowalczykarXiv 2025 · DOI · arXiv

Introduction

Traditional two-sided markets, such as those operated by Uber or Amazon, typically follow a company-led model. In these environments, companies act as the "leaders" by setting prices and service levels, while customers act as "followers," choosing whether to accept the offered terms. While effective for standardized services, this model struggles with the highly personalized and complex demands found in emerging sectors like satellite imagery.

In the satellite industry, approximately 70% of providers are small-scale operators with limited capacity. A single provider often cannot fulfill a complex request, such as high-resolution Earth Observation (EO) across multiple global cities. This research proposes a "role reversal" through a customer-led Stackelberg game, allowing customers to initiate tasks and companies to adapt collaboratively.

The Customer-led Stackelberg Model

The proposed model inverts the traditional market hierarchy using a two-stage game theory approach.

  1. Customers as Leaders: Customers with similar service requirements use social networks to pool their demands. By forming these "group-buying" bundles, they can leverage a discount factor ($\delta$), reducing individual costs while creating a more attractive, large-scale task for providers.
  2. Companies as Followers: Satellite providers respond to these bundled demands. To handle tasks exceeding their individual capabilities, providers form collaborative teams.
Comparison between traditional company-led and the proposed customer-led Stackelberg game models.

The researchers mathematically proved the existence of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) for the follower (company) game and a Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) for the leader (customer) game. This ensures market stability where no participant can improve their outcome by unilaterally changing their strategy.

Experimental Validation

The model was validated using a high-fidelity simulation of the Satellite Constellation Services market. Utilizing the Basilisk Simulation Platform, the study generated realistic Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite data for 80 global cities. Pricing was modeled after real-world EO market rates ($8–$12 per sq. km) across three resolution tiers. The simulation tested scenarios with up to 10,000 customers to evaluate scalability and performance.

Key Results

The customer-led approach yielded significant improvements across all primary market metrics:

  • Cost Efficiency: Customers achieved a 23% reduction in payments compared to the company-led baseline.
  • Revenue Growth: By capturing the "long tail" of complex demands that were previously unmanageable, company revenues increased by an average of 6.7 times, with some scenarios reaching a 14-fold increase.
  • Task Completion: In traditional models, roughly 75% of customer tasks failed due to limited provider coverage. The proposed model achieved a 100% task completion rate when high levels of cooperation were enabled.
Proportion of failed customers decreases significantly as similarity for team formation increases in the customer-led model.

Conclusion and Future Work

This research demonstrates that "bottom-up" market designs can be mathematically sound and economically superior for complex resource allocation. By prioritizing cooperation over competition, the model enables small-scale providers to compete for high-value contracts while lowering costs for customers.

Future work will address the computational overhead of clustering large customer bases and explore dynamic task allocation to account for real-time changes in satellite positions and shifting customer demands. Additionally, incorporating trust mechanisms for provider teams could further enhance the reliability of the collaborative model.

Summary updated

Abstract

Multi-agent systems (MAS) are increasingly applied to complex task allocation in two-sided markets, where agents such as companies and customers interact dynamically. Traditional company-led Stackelberg game models, where companies set service prices, and customers respond, struggle to accommodate diverse and personalised customer demands in emerging markets like crowdsourcing. This paper proposes a customer-led Stackelberg game model for cost-efficient task allocation, where customers initiate tasks as leaders, and companies create their strategies as followers to meet these demands. We prove the existence of Nash Equilibrium for the follower game and Stackelberg Equilibrium for the leader game while discussing their uniqueness under specific conditions, ensuring cost-efficient task allocation and improved market performance. Using the satellite constellation services market as a real-world case, experimental results show a 23% reduction in customer payments and a 6.7-fold increase in company revenues, demonstrating the model's effectiveness in emerging markets.
BibTeX
@misc{qiao2025task,
  author = {Jianglin Qiao and Zehong Cao and Dave de Jonge and Ryszard Kowalczyk},
  title = {{Task Allocation in Customer-led Two-sided Markets with Satellite Constellation Services}},
  year = {2025},
  eprint = {2501.13364},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.13364},
}
Figure