Talking to strangers without taking their candy: isolating proxied content

Adrienne Felt, Pieter Hooimeijer, David Evans, Westley WeimerSNS 2008 · OpenReview

Abstract

Social networks have begun supporting external content integration with platforms like OpenSocial and the Facebook API. These platforms let users install third- party applications and are a popular example of a mashup. Content integration is often accomplished by proxying the third-party content or importing third-party scripts. However, these methods introduce serious risks of user impersonation and data exposure. Modern browsers provide no mechanism to differentiate between trusted and untrusted embedded content. As a result, content providers are forced to trust third-party scripts or ensure user safety by means of server-side code sanitization. We demonstrate the difficulties of server-side code filtering -- and the ramifications of its failure - with an example from the Facebook Platform. We then propose browser modifications that would distinguish between trusted and untrusted content and enforce their separation.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{felt2008talking,
  author = {Adrienne Felt and Pieter Hooimeijer and David Evans and Westley Weimer},
  title = {{Talking to strangers without taking their candy: isolating proxied content}},
  booktitle = {SNS},
  year = {2008},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=uz-kOTNoZiH},
}

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