SybilGuard

Haifeng Yu, Michael Kaminsky, Phillip B. Gibbons, Abraham D. FlaxmanACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review 2006 · DOI

Abstract

Peer-to-peer and other decentralized,distributed systems are known to be particularly vulnerable to sybil attacks . In a sybil attack,a malicious user obtains multiple fake identities and pretends to be multiple, distinct nodes in the system. By controlling a large fraction of the nodes in the system,the malicious user is able to "out vote" the honest users in collaborative tasks such as Byzantine failure defenses. This paper presents SybilGuard , a novel protocol for limiting the corruptive influences of sybil attacks.Our protocol is based on the "social network "among user identities, where an edge between two identities indicates a human-established trust relationship. Malicious users can create many identities but few trust relationships. Thus, there is a disproportionately-small "cut" in the graph between the sybil nodes and the honest nodes. SybilGuard exploits this property to bound the number of identities a malicious user can create.We show the effectiveness of SybilGuard both analytically and experimentally.
BibTeX
@article{yu2006sybilguard,
  author = {Haifeng Yu and Michael Kaminsky and Phillip B. Gibbons and Abraham D. Flaxman},
  title = {{SybilGuard}},
  journal = {ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review},
  year = {2006},
  doi = {10.1145/1151659.1159945},
}

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