STUDY ON COORDINATION OF CAPACITY RESERVATION UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

Danqin Yang, Tiaojun Xiao, Houcai Shen2011 · DOI

Abstract

In an assembly supply chain where the procurement cost of the non-key components is the manufacturer's private information,a dynamic game is developed to model the process in which the manufacturer reserves production capacity from the supplier providing a key component.A key point is how to coordinate the capacity reservation decision of the manufacturer under asymmetric information from the perspective of a third party,and analyze the effect of information asymmetry on the coordination mechanism.It is shown that a menu of reservation contracts not only induces the manufacturer to reveal true cost information but also coordinates the supply chain.
BibTeX
@misc{yang2011study,
  author = {Danqin Yang and Tiaojun Xiao and Houcai Shen},
  title = {{STUDY ON COORDINATION OF CAPACITY RESERVATION UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION}},
  year = {2011},
  doi = {10.12341/jssms11702},
}

Loading related content...

Figure