Strategyproof Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Hybrid and Obnoxious Facility Location Models

Itai Feigenbaum, Jay SethuramanIncentive and Trust in E-Communities @ AAAI 2015

TL;DR

This paper tackles the challenge of locating a facility on a line when agents have conflicting preferences (wanting it close vs. far) and can lie about their preferences. The authors design "strategyproof" mechanisms that incentivize truthful reporting, achieving good approximations for social welfare, and provide theoretical limits on how well such mechanisms can perform.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Imagine a city government deciding where to build a new public facility, like a bus stop or a park. Different residents will have different ideas about the ideal location. Some might want it close to their homes for convenience (type 2 agents), while others might want it far away to avoid noise or traffic (type 1 agents, often called "obnoxious" in this context). The challenge is that the government doesn't know everyone's true preferences or their exact locations. Agents, knowing this, might lie about their preferences or locations to get the facility placed where it benefits them most.

This paper focuses on a strategic variant of this facility location problem on a one-dimensional interval (a line). The core problem is to design a mechanism (a set of rules for choosing the facility location) that is:

  1. Strategyproof: Agents have no incentive to lie about their type (wanting it close/far) or their location. Truthful reporting is their best strategy, regardless of what others do.
  2. Approximation-aware: Since achieving the absolute best social outcome (e.g., maximizing total utility or ensuring everyone gets a decent outcome) might be impossible while being strategyproof, the goal is to get as close as possible to the optimal outcome. The paper considers two social welfare functions: "maxisum" (sum of all agents' utilities) and "egalitarian" (the minimum utility among all agents).

Methods

The paper introduces and analyzes several mechanisms for this strategic facility location problem. Key techniques include:

  • Deterministic Mechanisms: These mechanisms always produce the same facility location for a given set of reported preferences and locations. The authors design specific deterministic mechanisms and prove their strategyproofness and approximation ratios.
  • Randomized Mechanisms: These mechanisms use probability to select a facility location. This can sometimes lead to better approximation ratios than deterministic mechanisms.
  • Characterization Theorems: For specific cases (like only "obnoxious" agents), the authors provide a complete characterization of all possible strategyproof mechanisms, which helps in understanding the fundamental limits.
  • Lower Bounds: The paper establishes theoretical lower bounds on the approximation ratios achievable by any strategyproof mechanism, proving that their designed mechanisms are optimal in terms of approximation.
  • Utility Functions: The utility of agents is defined based on their type and distance to the facility. Type 1 agents get utility equal to their distance from the facility, while type 2 agents get utility equal to the interval length minus their distance. This ensures utilities are non-negative and comparable.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Strategyproofness is Key: The core challenge is ensuring agents can't game the system. The paper shows that simple optimization of social welfare is generally not strategyproof, necessitating the design of specialized mechanisms.
  • Trade-off Between Strategyproofness and Optimality: There's an inherent trade-off. Achieving perfect optimality is sacrificed for the guarantee of truthful reporting. The paper quantifies this trade-off through approximation ratios.
  • Hybrid Model is Novel: The paper highlights its contribution in being the first to consider a model with both types of agents (wanting it close and far) in a strategic setting.
  • Lower Bounds are Tight: The paper proves that the approximation ratios achieved by their proposed mechanisms are the best possible, meaning no strategyproof mechanism can do better for these specific objectives.
  • Randomization Can Help: While deterministic mechanisms achieve a 3-approximation for the maxisum objective, randomization can improve this to 2/3 in some cases, though it doesn't fundamentally change the lower bounds for the maxisum objective.
  • Obnoxious Agents are Harder: For the "obnoxious" facility problem (only type 1 agents), the paper characterizes all strategyproof mechanisms and shows that the egalitarian objective has an unbounded approximation ratio, meaning no strategyproof mechanism can guarantee a good outcome for everyone in the worst case.

Key Results

  • Deterministic Mechanisms:
    • A 3-approximate strategyproof mechanism for the maxisum objective in the hybrid model.
  • A characterization of all deterministic strategyproof mechanisms for the obnoxious facility problem.
  • A lower bound of 3 for the maxisum objective in the obnoxious facility problem, proving the optimality of their 3-approximate mechanism.
  • An unbounded approximation ratio for the egalitarian objective in the obnoxious facility problem.
  • Randomized Mechanisms:
    • A 2/3-approximate strategyproof mechanism for the maxisum objective in the hybrid model.
  • Lower bounds of 2/3 and 3/4 for the maxisum and egalitarian objectives, respectively, even for obnoxious agents.
  • Generalized Model (Multiple Locations per Agent):
    • A 3-approximate strategyproof deterministic mechanism for the maxisum objective (when T={1}).
  • A family of 3-approximate strategyproof randomized mechanisms for the maxisum objective (when T={1}).

Limitations and Future Work

  • Approximation Ratios: While the paper achieves good approximation ratios, the question of whether further improvements are possible, especially with more sophisticated randomization, remains open.
  • Randomized Mechanism Characterization: The paper provides specific randomized mechanisms and bounds but doesn't offer a complete characterization of all randomized strategyproof mechanisms.
  • Topologies Beyond Intervals: The current work is limited to a one-dimensional interval. Extending the analysis to more complex network topologies or graph structures is a significant future direction.
  • Other Objectives: Exploring other social welfare objectives beyond maxisum and egalitarian could be fruitful.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@inproceedings{feigenbaum2015strategyproof,
  author = {Itai Feigenbaum and Jay Sethuraman},
  title = {{Strategyproof Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Hybrid and Obnoxious Facility Location Models}},
  booktitle = {Incentive and Trust in E-Communities @ AAAI},
  year = {2015},
}
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