Strategy Analysis of Multi-Agent Governance on the E-Commerce Platform

Hongyang He, Bin ZhangJ. Theor. Appl. Electron. Commer. Res 2022 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper tackles the challenge of ensuring product quality on e-commerce platforms by modeling the interactions between government, platforms, and merchants using evolutionary game theory. It proposes that a more flexible, continuous approach to regulation by the government and platforms, rather than a binary "regulate/deregulate" or "responsible/irresponsible" stance, is crucial for achieving stable merchant compliance and improving product quality.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

The rapid growth of e-commerce has unfortunately led to a surge in product quality issues, such as shoddy goods and misleading descriptions. This not only harms consumers but also hinders the healthy development of the e-commerce industry. While multi-agent governance models involving government, platforms, and consumers are recognized as a solution, the specific strategies for effective regulation remain unclear. Existing research often simplifies the regulatory choices of the government and platforms into binary options, which may not accurately reflect the nuanced reality of market dynamics and thus limit the effectiveness of proposed solutions. This paper aims to bridge this gap by exploring more sophisticated, continuous regulatory strategies.

Methods

The core of this research lies in the application of evolutionary game theory. The authors construct a multi-agent game model involving the government, e-commerce platforms, and merchants. Initially, they analyze the system with a binary strategy set for the government (Regulation/Deregulation) and platform (Responsible/Irresponsible), and merchants (Compliance/Violation). Crucially, they then extend this to a continuous strategy set for the government (degree of supervision, $x \in [0,1]$) and platform (degree of scrutiny, $y \in [0,1]$), while merchants retain their binary strategy. This allows for a more granular analysis of how different levels of regulatory intervention impact merchant behavior and product quality. The stability of different strategy combinations (equilibrium points) is analyzed using Jacobian matrices and replication dynamic equations.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Binary regulation is insufficient: The study highlights that a simple "regulate or don't regulate" approach by the government, or "responsible or irresponsible" by platforms, often leads merchants to default to non-compliant behavior.
  • Continuous regulation is key: Allowing the government and platforms to adopt flexible, continuous strategies (e.g., varying degrees of supervision and scrutiny) is essential for achieving stable merchant compliance.
  • Government-platform synergy matters: Coordinated efforts between the government and platforms, where the government empowers the platform, are more effective than unilateral actions.
  • Merchant effort is context-dependent: While reducing merchant effort costs can incentivize compliance, this is most effective in smaller consumer markets. In larger markets, merchants may still prioritize profit over quality even with reduced costs.
  • Inertia in regulation: The study suggests that government and platform regulation is often reactive, driven by the need to maintain a healthy market environment rather than proactive efforts to foster quality from the outset.

Key Results

The analysis reveals that under a binary strategy set, merchants tend to evolve towards illegal operations, regardless of government or platform actions. However, when the government and platform adopt continuous strategies, the system can evolve towards a stable state of {Regulation, Responsible, Compliance}. This continuous strategy approach allows for more effective guidance of merchants towards improving their effort levels and achieving compliance, especially when parameters like the government's right space for platforms, consumer group size, and fines for violations are optimized. The study suggests that this continuous model is more aligned with market realities than the binary approach.

Limitations and Future Work

The authors acknowledge that their model primarily focuses on the government, platforms, and the public. Future work should incorporate other social actors like the media and third-party industry organizations. Additionally, the potential for collusion between the government and platforms, and the dual identity conflict of platforms as both service providers and regulators, are identified as important areas for further research. The study also notes that while continuous strategies can guide merchants towards compliance, the quality of products may still be low if merchant effort levels are not sufficiently incentivized.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@article{he2022strategy,
  author = {Hongyang He and Bin Zhang},
  title = {{Strategy Analysis of Multi-Agent Governance on the E-Commerce Platform}},
  journal = {J. Theor. Appl. Electron. Commer. Res.},
  year = {2022},
  doi = {10.3390/jtaer18010001},
}
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