Strategic candidacy with reluctance

Edith Elkind, Svetlana Obraztsova, Maria Polukarov, Zinovi RabinovichTheory 2026 · DOI

Abstract

In strategic candidacy games, both voters and candidates have preferences regarding the election results, and candidates strategically decide whether to participate or abstain, in order to sway the outcome in their preferred direction. Often, it is assumed that candidates are keen to be elected or even just show up for visibility purposes, unless their presence is harmful. However, there may be candidates who find it costly to run an electoral campaign in the first place and therefore prefer to withdraw if their participation has no effect on the election outcome (a.k.a. lazy candidates), or those who would rather not win the election due to perceived interpersonal or reputational risks, unless they see no better alternative (a.k.a. reluctant leaders). In this work, we open the study of reluctance in strategic candidacy, and extend the standard candidacy game model to incorporate the concepts of reluctant participation (lazy candidacy) and reluctant leadership. We examine the pure-strategy Nash equilibria and the outcomes of natural iterative dynamic processes in such games, both from a normative and from a computational perspective, and compare them with their counterparts in the conventional model.

Introduction

In the field of social choice theory, Strategic Candidacy Games (SCGs) analyze how potential candidates decide to enter or abstain from an election to influence the final outcome. Traditional models often assume candidates are inherently ambitious, always ranking themselves first and ignoring the costs associated with campaigning. However, real-world political behavior often involves "reluctance"—where individuals may find running for office costly or may not even desire the position itself.

This paper extends the standard candidacy game framework to incorporate "lazy candidates" and "reluctant leaders," examining how these realistic behavioral traits affect election stability and computational complexity.

Modeling Reluctance: Lazy Candidates and Reluctant Leaders

The authors introduce two primary personas to the SCG framework to better reflect human behavior:

  1. The Lazy Candidate: These individuals are willing to participate if their entry changes the election outcome to a more preferred winner. However, if their participation does not alter the result, they prefer to abstain to avoid the "infinitesimal" costs of campaigning. They only run if they are "pivotal."
  2. The Reluctant Leader: These candidates do not wish to win. They might rank several other candidates above themselves but will step forward if their participation prevents a significantly worse outcome. Such leaders are often perceived as highly desirable winners due to their perceived sincerity and lack of personal ambition, though the paper shows that reaching a state where they win is computationally difficult.

To quantify this, the paper introduces k-reluctance, where a candidate ranks $k$ other individuals above themselves. A 0-reluctant candidate is the traditional power-seeker, while an $(m-1)$-reluctant candidate is "self-refusing."

Equilibrium Analysis and Stability

The study focuses on Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria (PSNE)—states where no candidate can improve their utility by unilaterally changing their participation status.

A key finding is that laziness can destroy stability. In standard models with "self-supporting" preferences, stable outcomes are generally guaranteed for small fields. However, in Lazy Candidacy Games (LCGs), a candidate might quit because they aren't winning, but their withdrawal might shift the vote distribution such that a less desirable candidate wins, leading to cycles of instability.

The authors establish a subset relationship: every stable outcome (PSNE) of a lazy candidacy game is also a stable outcome of a standard game, but the reverse is not true. Laziness acts as a filter that removes certain equilibria that would otherwise be considered stable in the traditional model.

The authors also examine W-dynamics (Withdrawal dynamics), which models the natural winnowing process of an election field. Interestingly, the paper demonstrates that this iterative process does not always lead to a Nash Equilibrium. A candidate might drop out and later regret the decision, though real-world rules often prevent re-entry.

Computational Complexity

From a computational perspective, the introduction of reluctance makes the problem significantly harder. The authors prove that determining whether a lazy candidacy game possesses any stable equilibrium (Lazy$∃$NE) or if a specific candidate can be made to win (Lazy$∃$wNE) is NP-complete. This proof is established through mathematical reductions from the Exact 3-Cover (X3C) problem.

Despite this general hardness, the problem remains Fixed-Parameter Tractable. If the number of voters or candidates is kept small, stable outcomes can be found in polynomial time, suggesting that reluctance is primarily a computational hurdle in large-scale or complex electoral systems.

Conclusion and Future Directions

By incorporating laziness and reluctance, this research provides a more nuanced lens for studying strategic candidacy. While these traits can introduce instability and computational difficulty, they reflect the genuine trade-offs faced by potential leaders.

The technical analysis focuses primarily on the Plurality voting rule. Future research could expand this framework to systems like Ranked Choice voting or Borda count, or apply it to multi-winner scenarios such as committee selection and participatory budgeting.

Summary updated

Abstract

Abstract In strategic candidacy games, both voters and candidates have preferences regarding the election results, and candidates strategically decide whether to participate or abstain, in order to sway the outcome in their preferred direction. Often, it is assumed that candidates are keen to be elected or even just show up for visibility purposes, unless their presence is harmful. However, there may be candidates who find it costly to run an electoral campaign in the first place and therefore prefer to withdraw if their participation has no effect on the election outcome (a.k.a. lazy candidates), or those who would rather not win the election due to perceived interpersonal or reputational risks, unless they see no better alternative (a.k.a. reluctant leaders). In this work, we open the study of reluctance in strategic candidacy, and extend the standard candidacy game model to incorporate the concepts of reluctant participation (lazy candidacy) and reluctant leadership. We examine the pure-strategy Nash equilibria and the outcomes of natural iterative dynamic processes in such games, both from a normative and from a computational perspective, and compare them with their counterparts in the conventional model.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{elkind2026strategic,
  author = {Edith Elkind and Svetlana Obraztsova and Maria Polukarov and Zinovi Rabinovich},
  title = {{Strategic candidacy with reluctance}},
  booktitle = {Theory},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1007/s11238-025-10113-4},
}
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