TL;DR
This study reveals how China’s 2007 accounting reform unintentionally created a "dividend tunnel." By switching to the cost method for parent-only financial statements, the reform allowed parent companies to manipulate their earnings by "ordering" cash dividends from subsidiaries to avoid reporting losses, which in turn helped them secure more debt financing.
What Problem Does This Paper Address?
In 2006, China introduced new Chinese Accounting Standards (CAS) to converge with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). A major change involved how parent companies account for their long-term investments in subsidiaries.
Under the old rules, parents used the equity method, recognizing their share of a subsidiary's profit as it was earned. The new rules mandated the cost method for parent-only statements. Under this method, a parent only records investment income when the subsidiary actually pays out a cash dividend.
The authors investigate whether this change gave managers a "lever" to pull. Since a parent company usually controls its subsidiary’s dividend policy, can it simply demand a dividend whenever it needs to "prop up" its own earnings? Furthermore, does this artificial earnings boost actually trick lenders into providing more debt?
Methods
The researchers employed a large-scale empirical analysis using two primary econometric models:
- Tobit Model (Hypothesis 1): Used to test if subsidiaries pay more dividends when the parent faces a potential loss or earnings decline. A Tobit model was chosen because dividend data is "left-censored" (it cannot be less than zero).
- OLS Regression Model (Hypothesis 2): Used to test if these subsidiary dividends lead to an increase in the parent company’s debt financing (new loans).
The study utilized Winsorization (at the 1% level) to prevent extreme outliers from skewing the data and used clustered standard errors at the company level to ensure statistical robustness.
Datasets
The study analyzed A-share companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets between 1999 and 2017.
- Data Sources: Financial data was pulled from the RESSET and CSMAR databases.
- Sample Size:
- 11,509 firm-year observations for the earnings management analysis.
- 14,643 firm-year observations for the debt financing analysis.
- Timeframes: The data was split into "pre-adoption" (1999–2006) and "post-adoption" (2007–2017) periods to compare the effects of the standards reform.
Key Insights and Ideas
- The "Double-Disclosure" Trap: China requires companies to publish both consolidated and parent-only financial statements. While consolidated statements show the "true" economic health of the whole group, debt holders often focus on the parent-only statement because the parent is the legal entity responsible for the debt.
- Discretionary Income: The shift to the cost method turned subsidiary dividends into a discretionary tool. Managers can time these payments to ensure the parent company never shows a "red" year, even if the underlying business is struggling.
- Information Asymmetry: The results suggest that lenders in a "double-disclosure" system may rely too heavily on parent-only accounting information, allowing firms to use internal cash transfers to signal a creditworthiness that might not be entirely accurate.
Key Results
- Earnings Management: After 2007, subsidiaries were significantly more likely to pay dividends to parents that were at risk of reporting a loss or an earnings decrease. The coefficient for the interaction term (
CAS*LOSS) was 0.008 (p < 0.05), confirming that the accounting reform triggered this behavior. - Financing Impact: These dividends weren't just for show—they worked. The study found a significantly positive association between these "propped up" dividends and the parent’s ability to borrow more money (
CAS*sDividendcoefficient of 0.216, p < 0.1). - Dividend Increase: The average subsidiary dividend (scaled by assets) more than doubled from the pre-reform period (0.0100) to the post-reform period (0.0220).
Limitations and Future Work
The paper focuses specifically on the Chinese "double-disclosure" context. While this provides a "natural experiment" for accounting changes, the results might not translate directly to countries with different reporting requirements (like the US).
Future Work could explore:
- Subsidiary Health: Does "hollowing out" subsidiaries to pay parent dividends hurt the long-term growth or stability of those subsidiaries?
- Lender Sophistication: Do more sophisticated lenders (e.g., large international banks) see through these dividend transfers compared to smaller, local lenders?
- Market Reaction: How do equity investors (stock market) react to these transfers compared to debt holders?
Summary updated