Short: Breaking the Charge: Exploiting State Manipulation in EV Charging

Ce Zhou, Qiben Yan, Zhiyan Yu, Eshan Dixit, Ning Zhang, Huacheng Zeng, Alireza Safdari GhanhdariVehicleSec 2025 · OpenReview

TL;DR

Researchers have developed "ChargeX," a novel attack that exploits vulnerabilities in the SAE J1772 EV charging protocol. By physically tampering with charging cables, ChargeX can manipulate charging states, leading to denial-of-service attacks or potentially damaging overcharging of EV batteries, undermining trust in EV charging infrastructure.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

The widespread adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) hinges on a robust and secure charging infrastructure. While research has touched upon EV security, the specific communication protocols used in AC charging, particularly the prevalent SAE J1772 standard, have remained relatively under-explored. This paper addresses the lack of thorough security investigation into the J1772 charging control protocol, highlighting its vulnerability to state manipulation attacks. The authors aim to demonstrate how an attacker can disrupt normal charging operations, potentially causing denial-of-service (DoS) or even damaging EV batteries through overcharging, thereby eroding user confidence in the EV charging ecosystem.

Methods

The core of the ChargeX attack lies in manipulating the PWM (Pulse-Width Modulation) control pilot signals exchanged between the EV and the Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE), or charger. The authors propose two primary attack vectors, both implemented by inserting a hardware attack circuit into a modified charging extension cable:

  • Serial Insertion Attack: This method involves adding a resistor (Ratt) in series with the existing components within the EV's charging control circuit. By strategically adjusting Ratt, the attacker can create a discrepancy between the voltage perceived by the EVSE and the EV. This difference can lead to a communication fault, resulting in a DoS. The attack exploits the error tolerance range of normal charging states to induce this fault without immediately triggering a fail-safe mechanism.
  • Parallel Attachment Attack: This approach manipulates the load resistance on the EV side by adding a parallel resistor. This modification can force a state switch, potentially moving the charging process to an undesired state, such as an error state (F). The attack aims to alter the charging state to disrupt the normal flow of power and potentially cause overcharging.

Both attack designs are designed to be covert, requiring no external power source and being small enough to be hidden within a standard extension cable.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The evaluation relies on laboratory experiments with simulated vehicle loads and real-world testing with a Tesla Model 3.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Physical Layer Vulnerability: The research highlights that even seemingly simple physical modifications to charging cables can have significant security implications, targeting the fundamental communication protocol.
  • Covert Attack Vector: The use of a modified extension cable makes the attack difficult to detect, as it can easily blend in with legitimate charging equipment.
  • State Manipulation is Key: The attack doesn't necessarily aim to steal data or directly drain power, but rather to disrupt the state of the charging process, leading to indirect but impactful consequences.
  • Generalizability: While focusing on J1772, the authors suggest the underlying PWM control pilot mechanism is common in other standards, implying potential applicability beyond J1772.
  • BMS as a Double-Edged Sword: While Battery Management Systems (BMS) are designed to protect batteries, the paper hints that they might not always be perfectly configured to handle these specific state manipulation attacks, potentially allowing for overcharging.

Key Results

The authors successfully demonstrated ChargeX attacks on commercial EV chargers, including two home chargers and one public charging station, using both simulated vehicle loads and a Tesla Model 3.

  • Denial-of-Service (DoS): The serial insertion attack was shown to reliably cause communication errors, effectively halting the charging process.
  • Potential Overcharging: The parallel attachment attack demonstrated the ability to manipulate charging states in a way that could lead to overcharging, as evidenced by continued current and voltage supply even when the vehicle indicated charging had stopped. In one instance, the Tesla's charging rate was shown to be +0 miles/hour while the charger was still supplying power.
  • Attack Parameter Ranges: The paper provides estimated and measured ranges for the resistance values (Ratt) required for successful attacks, showing consistency across different chargers and test environments. For example, measured Ratt for Charger 1 on Tesla for B→C was 2.95 kΩ.
  • Real-World Efficacy: The experiments with a Tesla Model 3 confirmed the feasibility of the attacks in a real-world scenario, with the attack's impact visible on the vehicle's control panel.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Manual Intervention Required: The primary limitation is that the attack requires a human to physically connect the malicious extension cable. This prevents remote attacks and large-scale automated deployments, which the authors identify as a future research direction.
  • Home Charger Accessibility: Accessing home chargers can be difficult as they are often located in private garages or yards.
  • User Vigilance: If the EV owner remains in the vehicle during charging, they might detect the attack through on-screen displays, especially if the charging status appears anomalous.
  • BMS Robustness: While the paper discusses the potential for overcharging, a deeper investigation into how modern BMS systems handle these specific state manipulation attacks is suggested for future work.
  • Defense Mechanisms: The authors propose user-level defenses (inspecting cables) and manufacturer-level improvements (stricter state consistency checks, tighter state tolerances) as areas for further development.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@inproceedings{zhou2025short,
  author = {Ce Zhou and Qiben Yan and Zhiyan Yu and Eshan Dixit and Ning Zhang and Huacheng Zeng and Alireza Safdari Ghanhdari},
  title = {{Short: Breaking the Charge: Exploiting State Manipulation in EV Charging}},
  booktitle = {VehicleSec},
  year = {2025},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=eRVMhHcVNp},
}
Figure