Introduction
Since its introduction by Porter and Kramer in 2011, "Shared Value" (SV) has become a cornerstone of modern management theory. It posits that corporate success and social progress are not zero-sum games but can be mutually reinforcing. Despite its popularity, SV has faced academic criticism for being a "buzzword" lacking rigorous definition and measurement tools. This paper addresses this "vagueness gap" by establishing Shared Value Economics (SVE)—a formal mathematical framework that defines, measures, and classifies models integrating profit and social impact.
Theoretical Framework
The authors propose an axiomatic foundation for SVE, centered on three core principles:
- Coalition Formation: Shared value is inherently collaborative, requiring a coalition of at least two intelligent agents (e.g., a firm and its stakeholders).
- Sustainability: A coalition's value is a function of both economic utility ($u_e$) and social utility ($u_s$).
- Consistency: The framework must be internally logical and externally testable.
The sustainability axiom is particularly crucial, as it defines the "sweet spot" where economic and social goals overlap.
Mathematical Foundations
To operationalize these axioms, the paper integrates three mathematical domains:
- Cooperative Game Theory: A Shared Value game is defined by a non-empty Core. This ensures a stable distribution of payoffs where no sub-group has an incentive to defect from the coalition.
- Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM): The framework uses Compromise Programming (CP) and Goal Programming (GP) to manage trade-offs between conflicting social and economic objectives.
- Utility Theory: Shared Value Creation (SVC) is quantified as the increase in the "Area Under the Curve" (AUC) of a normalized utility frontier following a policy or technological shift.
Illustrative Models
The framework is demonstrated through several theoretical models:
- Law Firm Model: Analyzes the trade-off between firm profitability and gender equality, revealing that perfectly balanced solutions don't always maximize social equality.
- Portfolio Selection: Adapts Markowitz's model to include socially responsible investment criteria.
- Carpooling Marketplace: Demonstrates how a coalition between riders and regulators can maximize social surplus while maintaining individual utility, qualifying it as an SVE model.
Results and Discussion
The paper provides a formal definition: a coalitional game is an SV game if it is sustainable and possesses a non-empty core. This allows for the objective classification of existing economic models. Key insights include the necessity of multi-agent interaction (distinguishing SVE from individual socially responsible investing) and the provision of tools to navigate "sour spots" where goals conflict.
Conclusion
By anchoring Shared Value in axiomatic rigor, this research moves the concept from management rhetoric to economic science. Future work will focus on the computational challenges of large-scale coalitions, the dynamics of bargaining power, and empirical validation using real-world corporate data to track shifts in the utility frontier.
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