Serial Monopoly on Blockchains

Noam NisanarXiv 2023 · DOI · arXiv

Introduction

In blockchain systems like Bitcoin and Ethereum, the "leader"—the miner or validator who produces the next block—acts as a temporary monopolist over transaction inclusion. While most research on Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs) focuses on single-block auctions, blockchains are continuous systems. Transactions not included in one block persist in the "mempool" for the next. This paper introduces the Serial Monopoly framework to analyze how this persistent demand interacts with a sequence of temporary monopolists, affecting price stability and economic efficiency.

The Serial Monopoly Model

The author develops a formal model where new demand arrives at each time step. A sequence of monopolists, each with a fixed supply $s$ (the block size), sets prices to maximize immediate revenue from the combined pool of new and "pent-up" demand. The study evaluates two primary scenarios:

  1. Non-Strategic (Myopic) Users: Bidders submit their true valuations without considering future blocks.
  2. Strategic (Patient) Users: Bidders can "shade" their bids or wait for cheaper future blocks to maximize their own utility.

Endogenous Volatility

A key finding is that non-strategic behavior leads to endogenous volatility. Even with perfectly stable incoming demand, prices do not reach a steady state. Instead, they exhibit wild, self-induced fluctuations.

Price oscillations in the non-strategic serial monopoly model.

As illustrated in Figure 2, a high price in one round creates a backlog of unsatisfied demand. To capture this volume, the subsequent monopolist is incentivized to drop the price, clearing the backlog but triggering a new cycle of price spikes. This volatility is an inherent property of the serial monopoly mechanism rather than external market noise.

Efficiency and Welfare

Despite the extractive nature of monopolists, the paper proves that serial monopoly is surprisingly efficient. It is mathematically guaranteed to achieve at least 50% of the optimal social welfare, and often exceeds 90% in common demand scenarios.

Comparison of monopolist, sequential monopoly, and market equilibrium on a demand curve.

Figure 3 compares the operating points of a standard monopolist, a sequential monopolist, and the market equilibrium. The sequential nature of the mempool forces the monopolist to move further down the demand curve (Point 'sequential monopoly') compared to a single-block monopolist, capturing more social welfare (represented by the areas A through J).

Strategic Stabilization

The most significant "aha moment" of the research is that strategic behavior by "patient" users actually stabilizes the system. To avoid being exploited by price peaks, users shade their bids toward the market equilibrium price ($p^{eq}$). This collective behavior forces monopolists to also charge the equilibrium price, effectively transforming a sequence of monopolists into a competitive market. In this strategic equilibrium, prices remain stable and blocks are consistently filled.

Conclusion

The Serial Monopoly framework highlights the importance of considering the persistent nature of the mempool in blockchain economics. While myopic behavior can lead to chaotic price swings, the presence of strategic, patient users can drive the system toward a socially optimal, stable equilibrium. Future research will explore the impact of time-sensitive transactions and the behavior of leaders who control multiple consecutive blocks.

Summary updated

Abstract

We study the following problem that is motivated by Blockchains where ``miners'' are serially given the monopoly for assembling transactions into the next block. Our model has a single good that is sold repeatedly every day where new demand for the good arrives every day. The novel element in our model is that all unsatisfied demand from one day remains in the system and is added to the new demand of the next day. Every day there is a new monopolist that gets to sell a fixed supply $s$ of the good and naturally chooses to do so at the monopolist's price for the combined demand. What will the dynamics of the prices chosen by the sequence of monopolists be? What level of efficiency will be obtained in the long term? We start with a non-strategic analysis of users' behavior and our main result shows that prices keep fluctuating wildly and this is an endogenous property of the model and happens even when demand is stable with nothing stochastic in the model. These price fluctuations underscore the necessity of an analysis under strategic behavior of the users, which we show results in the prices being stable at the market equilibrium price.
BibTeX
@misc{nisan2023serial,
  author = {Noam Nisan},
  title = {{Serial Monopoly on Blockchains}},
  year = {2023},
  eprint = {2311.12731},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.12731},
}
Figure