Selling to Risk-Loving Bidders

Ali Kakhbod, Ali JadbabaiearXiv 2011 · arXiv

Abstract

This paper proposes a new all-pay auction format in which risk-loving bidders pay a constant fee each time they bid for an object whose monetary value is common knowledge. We demonstrate that for this model, there exists a unique Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SSPE). This equilibrium is stationary when re-entry is permitted and Markov perfect when it is forbidden. Our analysis reveals that the seller's expected revenue is independent of the number of bidders, decreasing in the sale price, increasing in the object's value, and decreasing in the bidding fee. Crucially, we show that while revenue equals the object's value under risk neutrality, it strictly exceeds the value when bidders are risk-loving. Finally, we highlight the importance of re-entry rules, showing that auctions without re-entry tend to devolve into prolonged duels between only two remaining players.

Introduction

Internet "penny auctions"—platforms like the now-defunct Swoopo or the current DealDash—have long intrigued economists. These sites often sell high-value items for a fraction of their retail price, yet they remain remarkably profitable. The mechanism behind this profitability is the bidding fee: every time a user bids, they pay a small, non-refundable fee (e.g., $0.60) that extends the auction clock by a few seconds.

This paper addresses the underlying mechanics of these auctions, focusing on three primary areas: the source of the seller's high revenue, the impact of risk-loving behavior among bidders, and the structural importance of the "re-entry" rule. By modeling these auctions as dynamic games with complete information, we provide a theoretical framework for understanding why these "entertainment shopping" venues succeed.

Theoretical Framework and Methods

The study utilizes a dynamic game-theoretic model where bidders are assumed to have Constant Absolute Risk Loving (CARL) utility functions. This choice of utility modeling is intended to capture the gambling-like nature of penny auctions, where players derive utility not just from the item, but from the thrill of the risk itself.

Equilibrium Analysis

The paper identifies a unique Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SSPE). The nature of this equilibrium depends on the auction's rules regarding participation:

  • With Re-entry: If players can stop bidding and later rejoin, the equilibrium is stationary, meaning strategies do not change over time regardless of the auction's progress.
  • Without Re-entry: If a player is "out" once they stop bidding, the equilibrium is Markov perfect, where strategies are contingent on the specific number of players remaining in the pool.

Key Insights

The Engine of Indifference

A central finding of the model is that in equilibrium, players are exactly indifferent between bidding and not bidding. This implies that the expected utility of participating in the next round is equal to the utility of their current wealth. This indifference is what allows the auction to continue for many rounds, as no player has a strictly dominant reason to quit or to bid aggressively until the very end.

Revenue vs. Value

The paper proves a significant relationship between risk preferences and seller profit. If bidders were risk-neutral, the seller would, on average, earn exactly the value of the object ($v$). However, when bidders are risk-loving, the seller’s revenue strictly exceeds the value of the object. To maximize this profit, the model suggests a seller should choose a high object value ($v$), a low sale price ($s$), and a low bidding fee ($c$). This combination makes the "gamble" appear more attractive, inducing the aggressive bidding behavior that drives up revenue.

The "Duel" Problem and Re-entry

One of the paper's most practical insights concerns the re-entry rule. In auctions where re-entry is forbidden, the player pool quickly thins out. The author demonstrates that such auctions eventually reach a state where only two players remain. These two then engage in a grueling "war of attrition" that can last for thousands of rounds. This is undesirable for the seller; if one of the two players experiences a technical glitch or simply loses interest, the auction ends prematurely, potentially before the seller has recouped the item's cost. Allowing re-entry prevents this stagnation by keeping the bidder pool fluid.

Key Results

  1. Revenue Formula: When re-entry is allowed, the expected revenue is defined by: $$Revenue = s + c \frac{u(v-s)}{u(c)}$$ where $u(\cdot)$ represents the CARL utility function.

  2. Independence of Player Count: Surprisingly, when re-entry is permitted, the seller's expected revenue does not depend on how many bidders are participating. The bidding probability adjusts such that the total expected revenue remains constant.

  3. Superiority to Lotteries: For sufficiently small bidding fees, this auction format generates strictly more revenue for the seller than a standard lottery would.
  4. Auction Duration: The expected length of the auction increases as the potential payoff—the ratio of the net gain $(v-s)$ to the cost of a bid $(c)$—increases, potentially tending toward infinity.

Limitations and Future Directions

While the model provides a robust explanation for penny auction profitability, it relies on the specific mathematical properties of CARL utility and the assumption of complete information (where all bidders know the exact value of the item). Real-world auctions may involve private valuations or uncertainty.

Furthermore, while the paper touches on the "sunk cost fallacy," the core model assumes rational agents maximizing a specific utility function. Future research could integrate more complex behavioral biases, such as the "near-miss effect," where players bid more aggressively after almost winning, or the impact of "naivety" among new bidders who may not fully understand the equilibrium strategies.

Summary updated

Abstract

We propose a new all-pay auction format in which risk-loving bidders pay a constant fee each time they bid for an object whose monetary value is common knowledge among the bidders, and bidding fees are the only source of benefit for the seller. We show that for the proposed model there exists a Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SSPE) which is unique. The characterized SSPE is stationary when re-entry in the auction is allowed and it is Markov perfect when re-entry is forbidden. Furthermore, we fully characterize the expected revenue of the seller. We show that the expected revenue of the seller is independent of the number of bidders, decreasing in the sale price, increasing in the value of the object and decreasing in the bidding fee. Moreover, we show that the seller's revenue is equal to the values of the object when players are risk neutral and strictly greater than the value of the object when bidders are risk-loving. Finally, we demonstrate the importance of allowing re-entry by showing that without re-entry, the auction would last a long time and for almost all of its duration have only two remaining players.
BibTeX
@misc{kakhbod2011selling,
  author = {Ali Kakhbod and Ali Jadbabaie},
  title = {{Selling to Risk-Loving Bidders}},
  year = {2011},
  eprint = {1108.2018},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/1108.2018},
}
Figure