Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks

José R. Correa, Andreas S. Schulz, Nicolás E. Stier MosesMath. Oper. Res 2004 · DOI · OpenReview

Abstract

According to Wardrop's first principle, agents in a congested network choose their routes selfishly, a behavior that is captured by the Nash equilibrium of the underlying noncooperative game. A Nas...
BibTeX
@article{correa2004selfish,
  author = {José R. Correa and Andreas S. Schulz and Nicolás E. Stier Moses},
  title = {{Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks}},
  journal = {Math. Oper. Res.},
  year = {2004},
  doi = {10.1287/moor.1040.0098},
}

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